Opening Remarks. We Christians are presented with a difficult question: If God is sovereign, is humanity free? How true it is that answers to this question depend on what one means by sovereignty and freedom. Therefore, what type of sovereignty does God exercise over creation and the actual sequence of an agent’s events and actions? Also, within the actual sequence of an agent’s events and actions, what type of freedom does that agent possess? It is surely the case that freedom is needed for moral responsibility, but what type of freedom can provide an agent with moral responsibility? Can simply any view of God’s sovereignty be reconciled with human freedom and thus responsibility? On the other hand, can simply any view of freedom and thus responsibility be reconciled with God’s sovereignty?
In what follows, I will briefly discuss the philosophical concept of human freedom called libertarianism. It will be my contention that a human agent lacks libertarian freedom (i.e. the type of freedom that claims that an act is free, if and only if, an action performed by an agent at which time it is true could have been false). I know...big surprise. Libertarianism should be rejected based upon a psychological, philosophical, and theological critique. From a psychological standpoint, a libertarian would never be able to choose between two (or more) equally strong inclinations; from a philosophical standpoint, a libertarian has only reason(s) for acting and not a reason(s) why acting,[1] which implies that libertarianly free agents act for no reason at all; and from a theological standpoint, a libertarian limits God’s omnipotence and omniscience.
Libertarian Freedom and Moral Responsibility. Libertarianism rejects the notion that God (in any way or fashion) determines the actual sequence of events and actions in an agent’s life. As a result, libertarian freedom has been commonly referred to as incompatibilism (or indeterminism) for it claims that any form of determinism is incompatible with freedom and moral responsibility.[2] In other words, the freedom that an agent needs, in order to possess moral responsibility for an action x, is a freedom that is indeterministic. Jerry Walls echoes these sentiments when he states, “libertarian freedom is intrinsic to the very notion of moral responsibility.”[3] Perhaps this logically argument will best illustrate the Libertarian’s claim:
Premise 1: If the actual sequence of agent S’s life is determined, then S is not free and morally responsible.
Premise 2: The actual sequence of S’s life is determined.
Conclusion A: Therefore, S is not free and morally responsible.
Next, libertarian freedom not only entails an agent’s control over an action, but also the notion that nothing but the agent is the source, cause, and effect of an action.[4] So when an agent is presented with choice x and ~x, the agent is free, if and only if, the agent, while he/she did x, could have done ~x. This is why Walls states, “a person cannot be held morally responsible for an act unless he or she was free to perform that act and free to refrain from it.”[5] This type of freedom has come to be known as freedom of contrary choice (or the freedom to do otherwise).
A Psychological Critique of Libertarianism. A psychological critique of libertarianism directly addresses one of the key motivations of compatibalism (i.e. at the moment of choice, any choice is the result of an agent’s strongest inclination). While the libertarian wishes to reject this motivation, it is my contention that the libertarian cannot escape it. First, an agent experiences many inclinations in the decision-making process. For example, when I was deciding on what school to attend for graduate studies I had inclinations (or reasons) for choosing GCTS and inclinations for choosing SBTS. Now under a libertarian notion of freedom, any inclination for GCTS and SBTS is never the strongest inclination, but rather equally strong. So that at the moment of choice, the agent alone determines what inclination he/she performs, rather than being determined by any externally or internally strongest inclination, because, a strongest inclination entails a form of determinism.
However, if an agent has only equally strong inclinations, then how does one psychologically carry out an action that is based upon only equally strong inclinations? It seems that an agent could never live out such a belief. The donkey problem or “Buridan’s Ass” illustrates the impractical nature of this libertarian assertion. If a donkey has an equally strong inclination for oats and corn, then the donkey would stand between both and starve to death.[6]
A Philosophical Critique of Libertarianism.[7] The psychological critique of libertarianism is bolstered by a philosophical critique, which begins with a distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions for actions: If R1 is a sufficient condition for action x, then whenever R1 occurs x obtains (e.g. H2O is sufficient for water); however, if R1 is a necessary condition for x, then whenever R1 occurs x may not obtain (e.g. H is necessary for H2O but not sufficient for H2O). In light of this distinction, the libertarian notion of freedom claims that an agent acts apart from a sufficient reason, because a sufficient reason implies a form of determinism. So an agent’s strongest inclination is in turn a sufficient condition for a particular course of action. Therefore, if an agent has a strongest inclination for action x, then an agent will choose action x.
Rather, the libertarian claims that an agent can choose either x or ~x based upon necessary conditions (or equally strong inclinations). However, it seems clear that an agent who possesses only necessary conditions or inclinations for either x or ~x will never be able to choose between x or ~x because there is nothing that suggests what an agent will do. Not even a combination or group of necessary conditions (e.g. H2O) when they occur are sufficient to produce action x. For some reason, the libertarian is convinced an agent can perform action x with only necessary conditions. However, if an agent only possessed necessary conditions (or equally strong inclinations) for action x and ~x then either (1) an agent would never be able to make a choice between x and ~x (see the psychological critique) or (2) an agent’s reasons for doing x rather than ~x would be completely random and arbitrary.
The latter implication is the basis for a philosophical critique of libertarianism, and it delivers problems for the moral responsibility that libertarianism claims it only can offer.[8] The crucial point of this critique is a distinction between reasons for and reasons why. A reason for is a necessary condition and a reason why is a sufficient condition, because, once an agent has a reason why for action x then action x is determined. So if an agent has only reason for action x, then why did an agent do x rather than ~x? If an agent has only necessary reasons for action x, then an agent makes choices on no basis at all, and thus makes radically irrational and random decisions.
But suppose a libertarian is not so naïve. Suppose a sophisticated libertarian would claim that an agent can avoid randomness given certain factors. That is, the libertarian agent does not need a sufficient reason why x, and only a necessary reason for why x. In other words, for the libertarian reasons for provide an explanation for why certain actions occurred. Moreover, reasons for explain how an agent choose x, and for the libertarian this seems satisfactory. Therefore, reasons why are simply irrelevant for (or unnecessary for) explaining the decision-making process.
However, I believer that the sophisticated libertarian has not escaped the need for reasons why, and in order to illustrate this suppose that I am trying to decide between two seminary options: GCTS and SBTS. Now let us suppose that there are reasons in favor of choosing GCTS, and other reasons in favor of SBTS. Let’s label the former R1 and the latter R2. Now R1 may include such factors as a better location, closer to a major city, the ocean, and immediate family, a more diverse education than SBTS, Professor Richard Lints teaches at GCTS and not SBTS, and so on and so forth. Now consider the other equally significant factors that support SBTS, so that R2 includes the fact that SBTS costs less than GCTS, SBTS experiences less snow fall per year than GCTS, Professor Bruce Ware teaches at SBTS and not GCTS, and so on and so forth.
Now suppose that I finally decide on GCTS. If I possessed libertarian freedom, can I assert that I made this choice on no basis at all? Certainly not! I made my choice on the basis of R1. Now just to be certain, according to the libertarian, my choice was not causally determined (i.e. R1 was not a sufficient condition that necessitated my choose of GCTS), but that doesn’t mean that the choice was baseless.
So, the sophisticated libertarian may believe that he/she has a suitable rebuttal for the randomness charge. If the libertarian was asked, "Why did I choose GCTS?", he/she would respond, "Because of R1."
My reply is that the libertarian’s claim is simply missing the point. I would agree that R1 can be meaningfully cited as reasons for why I chose GCTS, but I submit that the libertarian is answering the wrong question. The relevant question is not, "Why did I choose GCTS?" but "Why did you choose GCTS rather than SBTS?" Again, I’ll grant to the libertarian that he/she has explain how an agent chose x, but they have not explained why an agent chose x rather than ~x. So again even the sophisticated libertarian dismisses the need to even answer such a question, which I find crucial for adequately explaining human action and attributing moral responsibility to human agents.
A Theological Critique of Libertarianism. My last method of criticism comes by way of my understanding of God’s sovereignty (GS):
GS: God exercises power and control over all events in accordance with his desires and intentions, plans and purposes.
As a result of GS there is a certain effect on human action (EHA):
EHA: GS controls an agent’s actions, thoughts, desires, and intentions in such a way that an agent’s actions, thoughts, desires, and intentions are always in accordance with God’s own desires and intentions, plans and purposes.
Now suppose their alternatives, which the libertarian would affirm. First, suppose the libertarian adheres to ~GS:
~GS: God does not exercises his power and control over all events in accordance with his desires and intentions, plans and purposes.
In addition to rejecting GS, the libertarian may surely reject EHA, and adhere to ~EHA:
~EHA: ~GS entails that H’s actions, thoughts, desires, and intentions are not always in accordance with God’s own desires and intentions, plans and purposes.
However, I believe there are two reasons why ~GS and ~EHA should be rejected. First, both threaten God’s omnipotence. Think about it. If GS is true, then God is not only able to do whatever is logically possible for God to do as the greatest conceivable being (GCB), but God is also able to do whatever he pleases. If God is able to do whatever he pleases, then nothing external to God can thwart God from doing so. If nothing external to God can thwart God from doing whatever he pleases, then God’s control over all creation and events is done in accordance with his own desires and intentions, plans and purposes (i.e. EHA).
However, if GS is false, then it seems that we are left with a God who acts and reacts according to whatever an agent pleases. Moreover, ~EHA implies that Gods stands above his creation waiting to see what we will do and then acts accordingly in light of his own desires and intentions, plans and purposes. Therefore, not only is God’s freedom limited with ~GS, but so is his power because ~EHA entails that humanity exercises a significant amount of sovereignty over GS. For it seems that an agent’s intentions and actions determine what God does and/or will do. Libertarians might see these entailments as a small price to pay to preserve their understanding of human freedom; however, if the compatibilist understanding is possible, then it should be preferable. The second reason to reject ~GS is that it entails a limitation to God’s omniscient. If H has only necessary reasons for acting, then who can know what course of action H will take? This is the grounding objection to libertarian freedom.[9]
Closing Remarks. The libertarian notion of freedom is troublesome for three reasons. One, libertarianism entails that an agent is truly unability to psychologically choose between equally strong inclinations. Two, libertarianism cannot escape the entailment that any choose an agent makes is at least partially random, and arbitrary, because he/she cannot account for why one course of action was taken rather than another. Lastly, libertarianism entails a view of God’s sovereignty that limits his omnipotence and omniscience, as a result of ~EHA and the power and control it holds over GS.
[1] Reasons for will be necessary reasons, and reasons why will be sufficient reasons. If H has only necessary reasons for acting, then why did H act? This is in short the randomness charge.
[2] J.P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2003), 270.
[3] Jerry L. Walls and Joseph R. Dongell, Why I am Not a Calvinist (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004), 105.
[4] This is often what libertarians mean by agent causation (see Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 278).
[5] Walls and Dongell, Why I am Not a Calvinist, 105.
[6] Although William Hasker suggests this as a possible argument in support of determinism (Metaphysics: Constructing a World View (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1983), 38-39) he ultimately concludes that is “empty and devoid of meaning” (Ibid, 43). However, Hasker’s proof for objection seems to be based solely upon a disagreement with the determinist’s (or compatibilist’s) claim, rather than a logical/philosophical proof. Thank you Prof. Lints for helping me understand this point of response.
[7] The meat of this critique is the randomness charge; however, it is at the outset of this critique that I must express thanks to my mentor and friend Steve Cowan, who pointed me in this direction many years ago. For Steve’s musings see his “Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: A Compatibilist Reconciliation,” Ph.D. diss., University of Arkansas, 1996, 74-81.
[8] Recall Walls’ and Dongell’s comment (Why I am not a Calvinist, 105).
[9] For more on the grounding objection see Steven B. Cowan, “The Grounding Objection to Middle Knowledge Revisited,” Religious Studies 39 (2003): 93-102.
