My dear friend, Alex Marshall, has most recently written quite extensively on the idea and meaning of human freedom. His lengthy article (published in a Yale journal) critiquing determinism, and his most recent blog post critiquing compatibalism, are both rather thought provoking. I would like to thank Alex for his thoughtful remarks and will now provide a response to his latter criticism of compatibalism. The purpose of this post is to demonstrate why the compatibalist understanding of freedom is the best option from both a psychological and philosophical standpoint, and then to draw an implication of libertarianism that I think all will find relatively shocking. It might be helpful to keep in mind the description of Creed Thoughts, as I hope it will lighten the mode. Now…off to the races!
The psychological side I feel directly addresses one of the key motivations of compatibalism. We have many inclinations in choosing and even many outside factors, which also play a role in anyone’s decision making. For example, when I was deciding on what school to attend for graduate studies I took into consideration which school would best prepare you for ministry, which school was the best financial option, which school would better suit Andrea’s (my wife) need to be closer to her family, and so on and so forth (my point here is that people have many factors pressing upon which form the strongest inclination); however, at the moment of choice (this is important as both the libertarian and compatibalist affirm) an individual always acts in accordance with their strongest inclination. However, my problem with the libertarian understanding of freedom is that they affirm that one could have done otherwise. I interpret (as well as many scholars) that the will is simply the mind choosing (as I think all would say) and therefore to assert that we could have done the contrary is saying this: I could have acted contrary to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice. To me this seems absurd! How could one do it? If one acts contrary to the strongest inclination at the moment of choice, would not that contrary choice then be that strongest inclination at that moment of choice? Moreover, how can one have two equally strong inclinations? One could never live out such a belief. The impractical nature of such a libertarian notion can be illustrated by the donkey problem or commonly called Buridan’s Ass. If the donkey had an equally strong desire for oats and corn, then he would stand between both and starve to death.
Also, the libertarian notion of freedom presupposes that man spontaneously acts apart from a sufficient cause. In other words, people’s strongest inclination is not the sufficient cause for their actions and thus libertarians presuppose that they can act otherwise and one’s strongest inclination is only a necessary cause. However, as I’ve demonstrated people cannot practically live out such a presupposition. For if they did one of two things would happen: Either 1) They would never be able to make a choice to act on their equally strongest inclinations (see the donkey illustration) or 2) Their motivations for doing anything would be completely random and arbitrary (and this latter implication delivers many problems for morality). In other words, if they could have truly acted to the contrary, then what is the reason for doing so? On a side note, it most recently has been bought to my attention that some forms of libertarian freedom answer the latter implication, but I would still like to hear about it.
My point again is that people simply do not act in a random or arbitrary matter. People make choices every day (I know I do anyways) and they have motivation for doing so. However, how can their motivation for their strongest inclination at the moment of choice not be the sufficient cause (It seems to me anyways that it has to be)? Remember that I am not saying that we do not have many other inclinations, but what I am saying is that someone can only have one strongest inclination, which is the sufficient cause, at the moment of choice.
In hopes of proving further proof that people act as a result of a strongest inclination I would now like to critic the libertarian concept of agent causation. However, first I would like to quickly state the emphasis that the compatibalist is making, and the short coming of the libertarian: The psychological and philosophical implications that people act or make a choice as a result of motivation and thus their motivation is grounded in two places: 1) People acted in accordance with their strongest inclination and 2) People’s strongest inclination is grounded in a causation by a transcendent cause (or unmoved mover). In other words, my critique of agent causation will rest on the belief that it is guilty of infinite regression and cannot be the cause of human choices.
However, just before I offer a critique of agent causation, I would like to clarify the two statements above as somehow being compatible with one another. Now I know that some of you might be thinking, SOMEHOW? But yes somehow. Somehow Jesus is both God and Man. Somehow Scripture is both the work of God and Man. Somehow evil exists while a truly good and benevolent God exists. Somehow God is three and one (note he’s not three in the same way that he is one, but I think that you get my point). And yes, somehow both the statements of there being a transcendent cause for our actions or strongest inclinations and humans being able to still be free as they act in accordance with their strongest inclination are compatible! Just as compatibalists and libertarians alike give logical arguments for how each of the above “somehow” statements are true, they all admit at some point that neither system is without any fault.
Now my next motivation for accepting compatibalism is based upon philosophical and logical reasoning which will in turn be my critique of agent causation. However, I would quickly like to bring us into this part of the discussion by asking a question: Why do I need to ground human choices with a transcendent cause? Well, in order to avoid an infinite regression of causes. How is one guilty of such infinite regression in the libertarian sense? Because a libertarian has no answer to give that truly grounds one’s reasons for discussion making. I know that libertarians wish to avoid such an objection by asserting that their reason for acting is grounding in the cause of the agent (or agent causation). However, this is highly question begging: Who or what caused the agent causation?
Keep in mind that, as I stated earlier, under the libertarian notion lays the idea that one’s strongest inclination is only necessary for making choices and not sufficient for making choices, and as I’ve noted I find that to be extremely problematic as it comes to determining why we do what we do and also the issues of such as they relate to infinite regression. As you remember those two points I would like to draw your attention to the reason why I am indebted to Flew and Hartley concerning this objection; because Flew nailed Craig concerning the latter point that I just made in a debate and Hartley includes a further discussion of it in his book.
The point imposed to Craig, by Flew, was simply this: How can you (Craig) be consistent in claiming that you hold to the idea that the universe has a transcendent cause (God creating it), while at the same time claim that your own human choices have no transcendent cause and it’s simply a “brute fact”? Now Craig’s reason or cause for human choices was agent causation, but how does that not become guilty of an infinite regression. It is important to keep in mind that Flew wished to attack Craig’s famous kalam cosmological argument, which asserts that the universe had a transcendent cause in order to escape certain Atheistic implication that if the world did not have a transcendent cause (or unmoved mover) then it would be meaningless to speak of time in the past, present, or even future tenses. Therefore, under the same rubric, is not libertarianism guilty of any infinite regression, as we can now speak meaningfully about the time and history of humanity and the choices they make (such a dilemma carries with it huge implications for morality as I believe I mentioned before)?
Moreover, here are some of Hartley’s comments. “In short, one (the theist) cannot demand that this universe has a transcendent cause based on the effect (the universe) because the opponent of atheism (libertarian proponent) proposes human choices that arise without a sufficient cause too.” Furthermore, the point I’m making (or Flew or Hartley) is that one cannot claim that our choices just happen as a result of “brute fact” and then be consistent in claiming that the universe had a transcendent cause.
Please note that I am not saying that libertarianism is atheism, but I am drawing attention to the notion that libertarianism relies on the same premise as atheism. Atheists say the universe is a "brute fact" needing no sufficient cause. Atheists say that the cause-and-effect within creation is somehow not applicable to an outside agent as the sufficient cause of the effect of creation. This is a violation of the law of non-contradiction, for an effect must have a definite cause…right? Likewise, the libertarian says free choices are without sufficient cause and could be otherwise and simply a “brute fact.”
Now I know that some libertarians would be fine with rejecting to the kalam argument, and I see no problem with that; however, I still have the need for the libertarian to answer for the “brute fact” concerning why people act of as a result of motivation and the strongest inclination (sufficient or necessary). Finally, how is agent causation not guilty of an infinite regression?
I hope I have spoken with clarity and please let me know what needs further clarification (as I'm sure there are many spelling and grammar mistakes to be found here) and/or anyone’s thoughts or response.
Be Blessed,
Nick
So I hope to provide a couple of interesting responses. Before we get too far into this, I should acknowledge that my particular understanding of libertarian freedom is colored by some dabblings in existential philosophy. So many more analytically minded philosophers might not like what I will say, but I think that's their problem...
ReplyDeleteFirst I want to deal with the so called "contra-causal" problem. Your claim is that libertarians claim that we can "really choose" which means being able to go against the supposed "cause" of our actions- our will. Here I want to redirect you to the critique of compatibalism that I offered. I don't know of any libertarian who will say that we can choose contrary to our will. That statement seems like a contradiction because it probably is one... However, there is a division between our will and our actions. The compatibalist wants to say that our actions are causally determined but we are still free if our will corresponds with them. The libertarian wants to say our actions are directly the result of our will. My critique of compatibalism is that it gets forced into the position of radically dividing the will and the actions such that there is no causal relationship between the two. This results in a will that is not actually the seat of our actions but just a passive observer that "condones" the actions that have been determined for us to do. Libertarianism can, however, maintain that our will is causally related to our actions, and the implication of this is that there are real choices because our actions are not causally determined by some outside force. But note well- the implication of that is not that we can choose contrary to our will, it is instead that our will can make a real choice about our actions.
Along similar lines, the donkey example is perhaps a bit more troubling for the libertarian. What does happen if we are completely neutral about a decision? Psychologically, I think this fits pretty well with the phenomenon of not being able to make up your mind about something. But as experience shows, that usually doesn't last for ever- we either eventually make a decision or we move on to another issue and leave that choice behind altogether. Robert Kane has written some interesting stuff about this- he describes this as a "quantum cloud" in the brain, worth reading if you want a more detailed discussion.
Now, on to the main issue I want to respond to, which is your critique of agent causation. This is important because I think agent causation provides a pretty good response to the "randomness" charge- if I as an agent with a will make a decision then making the charge that my decision was "random" seems less likely to hold water.
ReplyDeleteBut, you have offered a critique of agent causation, which is that my decisions as an agent would have to be "brute facts" without a cause, which might stand in contradiction to the kalam argument's claim that the universe must have a transcendent cause. I have two responses to make, both of which will be rather unusual in most discussions about this issue, and so I'm acknowledging on the front end that this should not be taken as a representative viewpoint of most libertarians (at least not in the American academy). But nothings worth saying if its not controversial, right? So here goes...
First, I could care less about the fate of Kalam argument. Sorry, Dr. Craig. I think the Kalam argument has too many assumptions built into it, and maybe those assumptions work but maybe they don't. Either way, I think the universe will be fine.
Second, I don't buy Craig's "brute facts" solution. I think I like better the idea borrowed from Heidegger and Catholic theologian Karl Rahner that we, in our essential selves, are transcendent. In other words, who I am essentially is not bound by the spatial-temporal existence of a scrawny grad student hunched over a computer, it extends beyond any spatial-temporal bounds and exists transcendentally. My essence, my soul, if you will, is what is free and that free, transcendent existence exerts a will on my spatial-temporal existence which results in my spatial-temporal actions. I realize that might seem like a huge move to make, but I am intentionally throwing the word "soul" in there to hint at the fact that I don't think this is really that big of a move. What do we mean by a soul but a part of my existence that is not bound by space and time and thus can exist after my physical body dies? That very spiritual-temporal divide is what existential philosophy wants to get at with its "transcendental divide," which I think provides a much better answer for agent causation than Craig's "brute facts" approach.
Alex,
ReplyDeleteI think you have brought up some good points, and some interesting implications, which I would now like to run through.
I would mainly like to respond to your critique of compatibalism in that it reduces or radically divides the will and the actions in such a way that there is no causal relationship between the two; however my question for you is how an immaterial will causally relates to a material action? In other words, your claim that the will and action are causally related to one another has huge implications for your dualistic understanding. Therefore, the best way to flesh out this problem is to briefly discuss the mind-body problem.
Note up front that I have no good reason to think that there is any such division between the compatiblistic understanding of the will and action if the will is caused by a transcendent cause (God).
First of all it's truthful that our mind or soul is above and beyond the physical; however such a statement does not mean that the physical and immaterial don't relate to one another (as you already know). The majority opinion among dualists is that the physical and immaterial are indeed causally related (this version of dualism is known as interactionism). That is, mental operations (such as pleasure and pain) are caused by body stimuli (tickling and pricking of the skin), and bodily movements are caused by mental operations. I am assuming that this option is the one that you would adopt; however I do not believe that it best answers the issue. For how can the material and immaterial substances causally interact? Look at like this: how can something spatial and material interact with something non-spatial and immaterial? For when you look at the material and immaterial they possess different properties and to claim that they interact with one another with no further explanation of how but simply a "brute fact" is not that convincing.
Now I find it relevant to state that your proposed relationship and interaction between the will (the immaterial activity of the mind choosing) and actions (the material) is guilty of the same criticism: How can the material and immaterial interact with one another? The best explanation to account for the relationship or interaction between the material and immaterial is occasionalism. For here, as Leibniz pointed out, the apparent interaction between the physical and immaterial is due to the fact that God has coordinated them occur in accordance with certain occasions.
ReplyDeleteNote here that such a form of combatiblism is noteworthy. The way or reason for the causal relationship between the immaterial will and the material action is God coordinating their causal interaction. Now allow me to simply assume that you're right in regards to your understanding that the soul is in fact transcendent and thus able to independently choose; however, you have still not given me a reason for why the soul chose something without implying determinism. For either the soul had a sufficient reason for choosing, or its choice was random and arbitrary.
To conclude, as you have probably noticed I feel that compatiblism gives us the best explanation as to how the material and immaterial interact with one another. Moreover, compatiblism gives us the most meaningful explanation as to why we choose certain things over others.
I hope this is hopeful and please follow up with me on any of this,
Nick
Your equation of Compatibalism with Occasionalism is exactly what I'm getting at in my critique. Once you make that move, I think you have basically three options. One is to say that the will freely chooses, all our actions are determined, and they coincidentally line up with one another. That seems pretty far fetched on anybody's luck. Second option is to say that the will freely chooses and God has determined our actions to match up with what we will freely choose. This is more or less the Molinist option (though they might nuance things differently). I don't think you want to say that. The final option is to say that the will is determined by God and so are our actions and thus they coincide. This works logically. But it means that freedom does not actually exist- our will isn't freely choosing, it is itself determined. There are a good many people who are fine saying this (in fact, I suspect this is what Luther and Calvin thought). But you can't say this and call yourself a compatibalist at the same time if what you mean by compatibalism is that freedom and determinism are compatible because once you make this move you have eliminated freedom. This is why my critique of compatibalism is that the only option open to compatibalism is the complete coincidence option, which seems absurd.
ReplyDeleteYour very right in pointing out that "interactionism" has its own sets of problems related to the mind-body issue. And there are a variety of ways to solve those issues. My main contention is not to argue for any particular one of those solutions, though I'll offer mine up for your reading enjoyment. My own view is somewhat of an "emerging self" viewpoint- our transcendent self grows out of our temporal selves over time, and this emergent entity then exerts causal power in the moments where we reach a serious crossroads. In other words, not every decision we make need be one where we have "multiple options"- many decisions are, I think, decisions that are in effect made for us. But I think they are made for us on the basis of "who we are" in our essence- my essential character determines the course I will take in life for the most part. There are those times, however, when we reach a significant cross-roads, when we face a major decision that impacts our essential character. Here, we have to decide what kind of person we are going to be, and that decision will set our course for another stretch of life. Thus, the "interaction" is one that works two ways- our transcendent self emerges from our temporal self, but then our transcendent self also guides and directs our temporal self.
Alex,
ReplyDeleteFirst of all, Compatibalism and Occasionalism are not the same thing, and I don’t think I said they were. What I did with both of them was to draw a connection between the two, but I don’t think I ever equated the two. I think one can benefit from the other, and learn how the material action relates to the immaterial will, but this does not mean that they are the same thing. Therefore, in hopes of clearing the air, I would like to present my understanding of compatibalism.
First, I would like to interact with the three options you give the compatibalist. The first option was, “to say that the will freely chooses, all our actions are determined, and they coincidentally line up with one another.” I don’t like this option. Next you pointed out a possible Molinist option, “the will freely chooses and God has determined our actions to match up with what we will freely choose.” Now I’m not for sure that the Molinist would phrase it like this (as you noted), but it almost gets to the point. The human will is free, and God has in some way determined our actions to match what we freely will, but I still would not phrase it like this and therefore, I don’t agree with this option either. The final option you stated gets even closer, “the will is determined by God and so are our actions and thus they coincide.” As you said “this works logically, but it means that freedom does not actually exist- our will isn't freely choosing, it is itself determined.” Not so fast there my friend, no compatibalistic system even eliminates freedom, and I think all of you’re options for the compatibalist are straw men and I’ll elaborate further in a second.
Before I tip my hand, I’ll finish interacting with the rest of you’re first paragraph. You said next that “you can't say this and call yourself a compatibalist at the same time if what you mean by compatibalism is that freedom and determinism are compatible because once you make this move you have eliminated freedom.” Hold the phone! Of course one could. Like I said, no right minded compatibistic system has ever eliminated freedom, but it has eliminated a libertarian understanding and definition of freedom. Therefore, if I were to demonstrate a certain understanding of freedom that would work under such a compatibalistic system then that would be ideal…correct? I know you know this Alex and I’m wondering why you left it out of your response. I’m sorry bud, but this is why I feel the options you gave were straw men, as none of them actually represent the compatibalist understanding of freedom.
So let me suggest an option which does not eliminate human freedom and responsibility. Here I have found Dr. Cowan’s remarks most helpful. What does it mean to say that God does not directly cause the actions of human beings? On the one hand, he does not step in and actually manipulate us like puppets on a string. Yet, on the other hand, he does determine (even in the actual sequence) what we do. In an attempt to answer this question, let me introduce you to direct causation:
“(DC) Someone or something (e.g. God) directly causes an action x of an agent S if and only if he/it circumvents S's deliberative processes such that S's performing x is not the result of his deliberative processes.”
I don’t like (DC), but I do like it provides the combatablists with some helpful remarks; however, “when and if God directly causes an agent to perform some action, on those occasions, the agent would not be responsible for performing the given action. However, (DC) leaves open the possibility that God determines S's actions in some other way that does not undermine their freedom. That is, we might say that God, when he created S, gave S certain desires and inclinations, together with an intellect that could deliberate on what actions to take to reach some desired end. In this more indirect way, God can then determine S's actions without directly intervening in S's life in accordance with (DC), and without undermining his freedom. S's actions would issue from his own practical reason. They would be the result of his own deliberations as to what he should do to attain the goals he desires to attain. And God would be in control because the goals, desires, and character of S, along with the reasons available to S, would have been given to him by God. Let us refer to this indirect way in which God exercises control in the actual sequence as indirect determinism.”
ReplyDeleteNow you may to wish to think that my construal of freedom and responsibility is highly dubious. In other words, you might be thinking that this is not freedom at all. Actually, what it is is not the libertarian understanding of freedom. In other words, your suspicion presupposes the thinking that freedom and responsibility requires the ability to do otherwise, and as I’ve shown that this psychologically impossible. At this junction, I would like to call to your attention to our discussion of the moment of choice, as you seemed to gloss over this point of clarification in your most recent comments. Keep in mind that we are not talking about how an agent S makes a choice, but why S chooses. Therefore, why does S do X? Remember, that I said they do so because of a strongest inclination, and yes which is determined. Would you agree at least with the former (the strongest inclination)? Next, I said that it’s psychologically impossible to have two equally strong inclinations and therefore the ability to do otherwise holds no water.
Also, I feel that you would object to my notion of freedom as a result of wishing that humans must be the ultimate cause for their action. In other words, there must be no outside factor(s) (whether God or something else) that influence and thus determine that S do X. For you, S and S only must be the final determiner of what they do. If this is part of your reasoning, then I would like to further demonstrate how this can reasonable be rejected.
At this point I would like to further develop the randomness charge, but first it seems that you would wish to associate freedom with causal indeterminism of human choices. In other words, it seems that you are presupposing that S must possess a kind of autonomy (correct me if I am wrong but this is your treatment of the soul). However, it seems for you to be consistent with libertarianism you must say that nothing sufficiently causally determines your choice- not you desires, values, upbringing, etc. For again none of the above is sufficient to produce the choice you will make. To be reasonable, you must be willing to say that you possess the ability to act contrary to your desires, values, upbringing, etc., or as you put it ““who we are” in our essence- my essential character…” which the soul chooses. In other words, S must be able to act out of his character. Now are you willing to say that the soul can choose contrary to who we essentially are? If so, then I think you have a problem on your hands and this is my randomness charge.
Now this is not solely my thinking. I must credit Dr. Cowan again for pointing me in this direction, and sending me the relevant chapters of his dissertation. The point that I will make concerning libertarianism is that it suggests that S makes choices on no basis at all. Thus this seems to entail that S has the ability to make radically irrational and random decisions.
ReplyDeleteSuppose this helpful illustration. You are walking along the beach when you hear a child’s cry for help as he is drowning in the ocean. You, an excellent swimmer, have ample time to save the child. Now under the libertarian understanding, you would not be free unless you had the ability to save and not save the child; however, suppose such overwhelming emotions of compassion and sense of duty came over you that you could not imaging refraining from saving the child. It seems then that the libertarian must admit that you were not free in acting because there is no way that you could have done otherwise. Also, I feel that for you to say that sure you still could have done otherwise leads us to issues of random and arbitrary actions. Why did you do one thing and not the other?
Let me set before us all an argument against libertarianism so that we can interact with it:
(1) If libertarianism is true, then S is free to do x only if S has the ability to not do x.
(2) If S is free to do x only if S has the ability to not do x, then any S*, who lacks the ability to not do x, is not free in doing x.
(3) It is not the case that any S*, who lacks the ability to not do x, is not free in doing x.
(4) It is not the case that S is free to do x only if S has the ability to not do x.
(5) Therefore, Libertarianism is not true.
The argument is obviously valid. Notice that (4) follows from (2) and (3) by Modus Tollens, and (5) follows from (1) and (4) by Modus Tollens. However, what about the soundness of the premises? It seems that (2) is uncontroversial, so my discussion will focus on defending (1) and (3). Let us begin with (3).
The illustration of you as a swimmer is most helpful here and provides a defense of (3). You have no reason to not save the child…right? Moreover, does your incapability of performing such an irrational act effect your ability to remain free in doing so? Hardly! You are free because you determined that it was the best option to take, and at the moment of choice you acted in accordance with your strongest inclination and thus your actions was determined, and saying that you could have done otherwise seems irrelevant.
But perhaps you would still find it relevant to state that you could have done otherwise, thus I think making the issue, concerning one refraining from acting in accordance with reason and their strongest inclination, about one’s conflict of who they essential are. Also, this brings to my attention your ethical moorings if you seriously would have considered, or simply really could and would not have saved the child. Please note that I am not saying you would ever do such a thing, but under the libertarian understanding of freedom you had the ability to seriously not do it. I think that libertarianism leads us all into feelings of deep despair if such a thing were true, but back to my argumentation.
But suppose such a conflict of essential self is your point (you notion of the soul at second glance seems goes against such a thing, but perhaps the soul is still seeking to identify who it (you) are). Therefore, we can image the conflict that ensures as a result of overcoming certain desires. We do possess certain characteristics and desires that would conflict with one another and thus produce certain temptations. We even have such characteristics and desires that change over time, as a result of discovering self identity, and produce other temptations. But for the libertarian, the point seems to be that one equally overcome certain temptations and not overcome certain temptations. Again the question I have for you is why? Why did you overcome a temptation to not save the child?
ReplyDeleteIn hopes of shedding light on this objection let’s move on to (1). Is it a straw man? Let me suppose that you do not hold to such a naïve understanding of libertarianism and indeterminism. In other words, you would say people can make a free choice given certain causal factors. Again, reasons play an important and necessary role in S’s decision making process. Actions are not formed randomly and arbitrarily. Of course, the reasons are not sufficient and determinative conditions, but provide a fuller explanation of S caused or soul caused events and why they occurred.
I would now like to present another illustration, which will show the fault of the more sophisticated libertarian or indeterminist. Suppose you are trying to decide between two job offers. Let us label the first job "JobA" and the second job "JobB." And let us suppose that there are reasons in favor of you choosing JobA, and other reasons in favor of you choosing JobB. The former we will call RA and the latter RB. Now RA may include such factors as that the salary is higher than that of JobB, the location is closer to the city, and so on. But, other equally significant factors support JobB, so that RB includes the fact that the location is closer to family, the work is easier, and so on. Now suppose that you finally decide to accept the offer for JobA. Can we say that you made this choice on no basis at all? Of course not, for you made your choice on the basis of RA. To be sure, according to the indeterminist, your choice was not causally determined (i.e., RA was not a sufficient condition that necessitated your choose of JobA). Still, the choice was not arbitrary or baseless. Likewise, if we applied this sort of reasoning to the case of the swimmer, we could say that as long as the swimmer had a set of reasons for preferring not to save the child, the action would not be random. So, the more sophisticated indeterminist thinks that they have an apt rebuttal of my premise (1). If asked the question, "Why did (the indeterministically free) you choose JobA?", you would answer: "Because of RA."
My response to this would be that your claim is simply misses the point. I would agree that RA can be meaningfully cited as reasons for why you chose JobA, but I submit that you are answering the wrong question. The relevant question is not, "Why did you choose JobA?", but "Why did you choose JobA rather than JobB?" I do not think that you can answer this question satisfactorily, and this is bad for the libertarian theory.
The point I am making here is that the libertarian or indeterminist has confused reasons for with reasons why. The former are the rational considerations that S has in favor of a given course of action; considerations that S might list in his deliberations as reasons which rationally justify a given choice. The reasons cited above in RA and RB are examples of "reasons for." However, reasons why are the explanatory factors that account for a given choice---factors which may go far beyond the rational considerations that are the direct objects of S's deliberation and include psychological and environmental factors. Thus, reasons why might include not only cognitive factors of S’s rational decision-making processes, but also "gut feelings," intuitions, desires, and any number of other non-cognitive psychological factors. "Reasons why," then, is a broader category than "reasons for" and encompasses the latter as a sub-category. So, for example, if one were to ask you for reasons why you chose JobA, your reason why might include not only the fact that JobA pays more, but also certain non-cognitive factors such as "it just felt right."
ReplyDelete“Not so fast!” (You may be thinking), as I perhaps might be begging the question. To you it might seem that I am assuming that there is only one type of adequate explanation of a choice, which explains why a choice was made at a point in S's psychological history. You would claim that this is unsupported, as the soul of S may very well be the explanations that preclude the actions and thus are the reasons why needed for such a theory.
However, I am afraid you are missing the point once more. The compatibilist is not begging the question, but arguing that the sophisticated libertarian or indeterminist cannot escape the charge of randomness. Here it is in the form of a dilemma: The question is, "Why did you choose JobA rather than JobB?" Either you have an answer to this question or not. If there is an answer, then your choice is determined (and libertarianism or indeterminism is false). If there is no answer, then your choice was random and arbitrary. So, if indeterminism or libertarian freedom is true, then the choices you make are random choices.
However, you may have one more reply to make in your defense. You may suggest that we should distinguish between two types of randomness: Partial randomness, which is the kind of randomness attached to your choice of a job (they being necessary and not sufficient reasons for producing your choice of JobA). In a sense, then, your choice could have been different than it was, but was nonetheless motivated by reasons, and you’re your choice was only partially random. On the other hand, a choice made apart from any reason whatever (a completely baseless choice) is a choice of complete randomness. You may claim, on the basis of this distinction that only actions or choices that are completely random are subject to the dilemma above, and thus partially random actions or choices escape the dilemma.
This may be your best defense against my randomness charge; however, it is simply not as clear as you would wish it to be as to how partial randomness escapes the dilemma any more than complete randomness. In other words, they are both random and such a distinction rests upon the earlier distinction between reasons for and reasons why. When the indeterminist or libertarian makes a choice only with partial randomness, he is focusing on reason for choosing JobA, which, are not sufficient to produce that choice. And this means that the indeterminist or libertarian is admitting that there is no causally sufficient reason why you chose JobA over JobB. And this places the burden of ability on S to make a choice which either has no basis at all, or arbitrarily counters the other preferable action. Keep in mind here that to say there is no causally sufficient reason why is to say that there is no factor whatsoever (not even a "gut feeling" or some subconscious desire) which is sufficient to produce the choice in question. To highlight this difficulty for the libertarian or indeterminist, let’s set forth another dilemma in more precise terms:
ReplyDelete(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why you chose JobA rather than JobB, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then your choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then your choice is (at least) partially random.
This randomness charge was the main force of my comments. I hope it’s clear and let me know what questions you have, and issues of clarification you might wish to share as I might have misrepresented you. Note that the later was neither my goal nor intention; I was only trying to interact with the follies of libertarianism. Lastly, I would enjoy and value any response.
Be Blessed,
Nick
I'll give you more thoughts later (as in, when its not one in the morning, I don't have to be up for class in a few hours, and I don't have an impending mid-term), but here's the really quick version:
ReplyDeleteYour final argument is this dilemma:
(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why you chose JobA rather than JobB, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then your choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then your choice is (at least) partially random.
My response is to say that premise (2) is false. A causally sufficient reason is not equivalent to determinism (though determinism could be a causally sufficient reason, the terms are not equivalent). Therefore, the randomness objection fails and I don't have to accept premise (3) if I am a libertarian.
Alex,
ReplyDeleteI hope your classes are going well and I’ll be praying as your mid-term becomes ever pressing. And yes, I look forward to your fuller thinking on the matter, but in the mean time I’ll clarify premise (2).
It seems that you have mistaken causal relationship with equivocation. The conditional statement of (2) does not mean that they are logical equivalent, but expresses a relation of implication. See Hurley’s A Concise Introduction to Logic. I know there is a 10th ed out now but I only have the 9th, but here are the page numbers for the 9th: 281-82. Given this, I find it crucial to state the definition of logically equivalence, in order to show you the difference. When comparing two propositions or statements, they are said to be logically equivalent if they have the same truth value on each line under their main operators (see again Hurley, 306). Notice that I don’t have two independent statements in (2) but a conditional statement. Now to show the conditional or causal relationship between sufficient reasons and determinism, I’ll phrase it another way: Your choice is determined if there are sufficient reasons for your choice. In other words, your choice is determined because of the sufficient factors or reasons for choosing so. Now I’m pretty sure you know the difference between sufficient and necessary reasons, but for those of you who don’t I’ll elaborate further. If one has a necessary reason for doing something, then the act only possible and is not determined (and I say random). If one has a sufficient reason for doing something, then the reason is adequate (or sufficient) in that they will produce a certain action. Therefore, your action is determined by the sufficient reason.
Lastly, note that conditional statements function as expressions of implications and not equivocation. Therefore, premise (2) is quite sound and the randomness charge is still valid and must be addressed in greater detail (as I know you will when the time comes). My hope is that this has helped to clear the air, and directs future dialogue. For any one who might still be confused on the matter, I would be fine with discussing further clarification.
Be Blessed,
Nick
I'm certain Alex will be able to deal with this more ably than I. Nevertheless, I'll offer a thought or two.
ReplyDeleteNick, I can't understand why you feel it necessary to posit that if choices are not determined by some outside entity (i.e. God), then it must be the case that decisions are arbitrary and random. Is there really a need for such a jump?
Even a libertarian/indeterminist (to pick up your terms) believes there are reasons. If there are reasons justifying a decision, why does the self need a sufficient cause outside itself to make a decision? Why can't the exercise of the will be enough? I decide based on various data through deliberation to take course of action A, and then I engage my will carry out whatever action. Why is this not enough?
I think the issue of whether one could do otherwise than what they actually do is a red herring. The important point is that I myself am deliberating on, deciding on, and effecting a certain course of action over against others. Could I have done otherwise? Sure, I could have decided to something else. Perhaps, I could even change my mind after having decided on a certain action. It seems that I could assert that the exercise of my will is the efficient cause without invoking God determining my will.
Maybe this will illustrate my point. Positing that reasons are sufficient causes does not do justice to the actual decision making process that we experience. To say, "If job A pays more, I will take job A" and "If job B is closer to my current home, I will take job B" is to set up precisely the sort of situation that renders your presentation illogical. This is because to say that these reasons are sufficient causes is to say that as soon as these conditions exist, then their consequents obtain in the world. Given a pair of potential jobs that meet both of these conditions respectively (job A is in fact higher-paying, and job B is closer), these logical deductions would necessitate that I take both! Given this dilemma, the conditions only supply me with a (necessary) set of data, which I will use to make a decision, but it is the exercise of my will itself that causes action A to obtain in the world and not action B.
ReplyDeleteEven if we soften the consequents to "favor" a particular job rather than "take," the problem of action is not solved. The antecedents still merely provide the relevant data. I could in fact be inclined towards (favor) both of these jobs for various reasons, but my will is ultimately going to make a decision.
Thanks for reading,
Ryan
Ryan,
ReplyDeleteI have had a good bit of talks with you on this subject, and now I thank you for letting more than just I benefit from the content of our conversations. Quickly, I wish to let all of you reading this know that such dialogue with Ryan is one thing you must do before you die. I’ve had multiple chances to cross it off my list and I hope the rest of you do as well. Now your thoughts and questions raised were great, and what follows will serve as further clarification. Note, that I don’t think that I’ll state anything new which already hasn’t been stated, other than the sniper illustration concerning equally causal sufficient metaphysical logic.
First, correct me if I’m wrong, but the libertarian wishes to say that nothing determined S’s choosing. Also, no outside factor, other than S and S alone, is the cause of S’s choosing.
Building off this understanding (true or not), the necessity to state that choices are determined by something or someone is based upon the libertarian notion that none of S’s choices have a sufficient cause and thus any choice S makes is random. S’s choices are random because there are only necessary reasons for S’s choices, and then if asked why S did x rather than not x, and S has no sufficient reason for chooses x, then S’s choice, being based on only necessary reasons, was random and arbitrary, because S could have equally done otherwise. Now let’s again explore necessary and sufficient causes. If S has necessary cause to do x, then why does S do x rather than not x? Since S could have equally done otherwise (not x), S’s choice seems at best partially random. Now, if S has sufficient cause to do x, then the why question is answered, because the sufficient cause is the reason why S did x based on the fact that if you have a sufficient cause, your action is sure or determined by someone or something. Of course the someone would be the unmoved mover, or transcendent cause (i.e. God), and the something would be S’s desires, values, upbringing, etc. Keep this in mind though, if the libertarian is to claim that there is no causally sufficient reason why S did x, then this implies that there is no factor whatsoever (not even a "gut feeling" or some subconscious desire) which is sufficient to produce the choice in question.
Then you talked about the libertarian or indeterminist having reasons for choosing. Of course you do! At this point remember that I did grant the libertarian partial randomness, given the fact that S does have certain reasons for doing x rather than not x. I said, “…your choice could have been different than it was, but was nonetheless motivated by reasons, and your choice was only partially random. On the other hand, a choice made apart from any reason whatever (a completely baseless choice) is a choice of complete randomness.” Tying this back to the illustration of JobA and JobB, you might further remember the reasons stated in choosing one over the other; however, it is also important to note that I also said that those reasons were only reasons for and not reasons why (under libertarian freedom). They are reasons for because they are only necessary, and not reasons why because they are not sufficient in causing S to do x.
Next, I find it interesting that you said my understanding of libertarianism was a red herring. In other words, the notion that one could have done otherwise is in a sense diverting from or changing the subject. Well, what is the subject? Again this is interesting since you yourself believe it and affirm it to be an important factor of libertarianism. You said, “Could I have done otherwise? Sure, I could have decided to something else. Perhaps, I could even change my mind after having decided on a certain action.” This is the very point I am trying to make: If you could have done otherwise, why didn’t you? Again, this is my randomness charge. If S doesn’t have sufficient reason for doing x, then S’s choice is random and arbitrary. Because, necessary reasons are not enough to give reasons why S did x, only enough to give reasons for S doing x (and again, under the libertarian understanding of freedom, the necessary reasons for S doing not x are also present and thus very troubling for the theory as I’ve pointed out). In short here, I fail to see how this is a red herring as it is an important and major tenet of libertarianism.
ReplyDeleteNext, you made another interesting assertion: “It seems that I could assert that the exercise of my will is the efficient cause without invoking God determining my will.” This is the example of the libertarian entering into an infinite regression since I could still ask the question of why the will was exercised in the first place to cause such a choice. In other words, such a claim begs the question. Moreover, this is another example of the libertarian missing the point, and the distinction I made between reasons for and reasons why is important. The question is why did S do x, and if you don’t have a sufficient reason for why, and you could have equally done otherwise (again only necessary reasons), then your choice was random and arbitrary.
At this point, Alex has offered an answer to the infinite claim and stated that the soul is transcendent and thus capable of grounding the efficient cause you wish to appeal to; however, this implies interactionism and thus has its own set of difficulties which I don’t think Alex’s further explanation fully escapes. Moreover, Alex (or you Ryan whateveh) where did such a transcendent soul come from? If our desires, values, or essential self is rooted in the soul, then I would ask you hark back to my previous post where I talked about our goals, desires, values, character, ect. coming from God. I know that you (Alex) would not wish to say such a thing, but perhaps you can discuss it fuller in future dialogue.
Then you talked about how “sufficient causes does not do justice to the actual decision making process that we experience.” How so? In the original post I already mentioned that there are many reasons for S doing x, which help to form their strongest inclination, but the point is that at the moment of choice there is a sufficient reason for making the choice in question. Therefore, I don’t see how any of this is not doing justice to how we actually experience decision making.
Following this I think you have misinterpreted sufficient causes and again reasons for and reasons why. You said, “[since] these reasons are sufficient causes…as soon as these conditions exist, then their consequents obtain in the world. Given a pair of potential jobs that meet both of these conditions respectively (job A is in fact higher-paying, and job B is closer), these logical deductions would necessitate that I take both!” Yes, as soon as you have the sufficient cause, you have the result, but when you have the result is really beside the point and how can one have two equally sufficient causes? I find the answer to this rather easy: You don’t! At the moment of choice, S going with x means that there is a sufficient cause (whatever it may be). You see how sufficient cause works? The meaning or implication is not that you have competing ones, but that once you have it you have or will have your result. Such a dilemma is like taking about square circles and you can’t have such a thing.
ReplyDeleteNow there is talk of equally sufficient causal metaphysical logic. The most common illustration is the sniper one, which I think you know. There are two snipers that both shoot a bullet to kill a man. Their shoots occur at the same time and are both equally sufficient to kill him. Now the question remains, which bullet killed him? Well, I don’t know if we can make such a judgment and I don’t see how it would be relevant to the fact that he was killed. Now for you to tie this into sufficient cause of the will, I also fail to see its relevance, since you can’t do both things. In other words, you could possible question the effect of two equally sufficient metaphysical causes, but it then becomes a different subject when you talk of equally doing both sufficient causes. The later as I’ve pointed out is impossible for now we are talking about square circles.
Finally, since giving it further thought, it seems that your confusion here is based upon your thinking of necessary causes influencing your thinking of sufficient causes. Since all the necessary conditions are present in the decision making process, how is that S can truly make up his mind? Look at the donkey dilemma, which I mentioned as few comments back, to see how this works out. It was something that Alex overlooked and simply said that such a tension does not last long as S eventually chooses. But this in fact begs the questions of why x eventually chose. Again, the dilemma you posited above would only be a problem for the libertarian since they could equally do x and not x (necessary causes) and not the compatibalist (sufficient cause). In other words, again you cannot have two sufficient causes, for if you did they would no long be by definition a sufficient cause. It simply cannot happen. Lastly, sufficient cause is the reason why S chose x, because once you have the sufficient cause for x you will have x. The reason for S’s response was yes influenced by certain conditions, but reasons why S responded was based upon a sufficient cause.
I’ll leave you with this statement (I’ve said it before, so you won’t really be surprised by it): The libertarian cannot give a reason why, without implying determinism in one way or another (i.e. God, desires, values, etc.).
I hope this was helpful. Now, it seems to me that I am betting a dead horse, and in order to stop such a pointless act I am moving on to my school work, but I have a good feeling that I haven’t heard the last of you.
Nick
Ryan, greatly appreciate your comments. Think you are right on target. Hopefully between the two of us we can show Nick the error of his ways (though I doubt we are gonna change his mind...)!
ReplyDeleteNick, I think there is a fallacy of equivocation in your argument. You want to say that any sort of "causally sufficient reason" represents a kind of determinism- such a reason "determines" my actions or choices. In common everyday speech, such a statement might be agreeable to a libertarian- "I decided/determined to do x for reason y." But there are two different kinds of "determinism" at work here, and the kind of determination that a libertarian would allow for is not the same as the kind that you want to argue for in the end.
To illustrate:
In response to me you list a number of "determining influences" that might cause a person to make a certain choice- emotions, reason, faith, the will, etc. My first response would be to ask what exactly you think a person is if not these things. My will is not something external to me that makes me do something. My will is me. What my will does, I do. My emotions are internal to me- they are thus my emotions. So I don't see where your objection gets started- how can I choose contrary to my will? This is like asking how can I be human and an octopus at the same time. My will does not exist separately from me, so the question doesn't really make any sense.
So in a sense, yes, my will or my emotions, or these other factors that are a part of me are determining influences on what I do. But the important thing to differentiate here is that they are part of who I am. They are part of me making my own decision. In the end, if I will something, the libertarian wants to say, it is because I have determined to do it. That is very, very different from what you, in the final analysis, want to claim, which is that something external to me- namely, God- has determined that I would do this thing. That kind of external determinism is what the libertarian wants to reject, not the existence of cause and effect.
ReplyDeleteSo to return to your final argument:
(1) Either there is a causally sufficient reason why you chose JobA rather than JobB, or there is not.
(2) If there is a causally sufficient reason why, then your choice is determined.
(3) If there is no causally sufficient reason why, then your choice is (at least) partially random.
Premise two holds only if we take "determined" in its most broad sense- in which case, you are making it equivalent to "causally sufficient reason." If we take it in the narrower sense of an external force determining my actions, then this implication is false. We could say the following- "If my choice is determined, there would be a causally sufficient reason for it." But the implication of this is that there could be things that are causally sufficient reasons that are not external determinism- denying the antecedent is a fallacy. In either case, the randomness objection fails. I can be a libertarian, accept the second premise as you have written it with the broad understanding of "determined" and not worry about randomness. Or I can point out that the narrow meaning is unsound and the dilemma thereby untrue.
Granted, there are a lot of other issues to discuss, but I just want to focus on this one. Do you see why I need not accept the randomness objection?
I think you're right in pointing out the various meanings intended by "determined" in these conversations. I also think that distinction is the heart of the contention.
ReplyDeleteAlex, when you said, "My will is me. What my will does, I do. My emotions are internal to me- they are thus my emotions. So I don't see where your objection gets started- how can I choose contrary to my will? This is like asking how can I be human and an octopus at the same time. My will does not exist separately from me, so the question doesn't really make any sense," this is essentially what I was arguing in my post when I said that the question of whether one could have done otherwise is really a red herring. The important point is that the human agent, aided (but not forced) by the various input data, chooses to do and then does something.
I think that much of the argumentation above is girded by theological commitments that preclude those on either side from taking certain views of freedom. Nick, I feel secure in saying that you will never abandon compatiblism, because this view has the most explanatory power within your theological construct.
ReplyDeleteThe question concerns the nature of human freedom. We seem to have such freedom. However, to say that God has exhaustive foreknowledge of all future events because he has determined them all is to question this understanding of freedom. So, to maintain your understanding of omniscience alongside moral accountability, you invoke compatiblism because you believe it can explain how a human can act totally in line with what they want to do (the main contention, and thereby be accountable for their actions) while at the same time God can ultimately determine everything. This is because God is somehow determining their will, which then becomes the sufficient cause for their actions. Outside of this, you would either have to deny human responsibility (if God really is making us do things) or default to some form of Molinism or open theism (if God isn't determining our wills).
ReplyDeleteFair enough. However, I think that all you have accomplished is to give an account of our pseudo-freedom: it seems like we make our own decisions, but the reality is that an outside entity is imposing our will upon us in order to determine all events.
ReplyDeleteThis is why I think whether one could do otherwise is a red herring: it isn't the real issue. It doesn't matter whether I could have done different than I decided to do, so long as I am the one who decided to do it. The real issue is whether God or the human agent is the ultimately responsible entity.
P.S.: Thank you both for your kind words towards me above. I appreciate you both.
O no, two against one! I’m afraid the odds are not in my favor (hahaha). Now Alex, do you mean to say, “The ERROR of my ways” or “The error of MY ways”? In other words, did you emphasis error or my? This is a little Seinfeld humor, and a suggestion for you to watch “The Mom and Pop Store” episode, Season 6 episode 7. It’s quite fantastic if you ask me. So, let’s see if such errors are logically sound.
ReplyDeleteFirst of all though, I would like you to know that if I see amble logical, philosophical, theological, biblical, etc. evidence for an alternative way of thinking concerning any issue, I then hope and pray that I will not be too stubborn to change my mind (“If the glove doesn’t fit, then you must acquit” kind of thinking). Also, I hope and pray the same for you. Therefore, your comments are not falling on a deaf ear (at least not on my end), and I hope the same is true of you (I have no reason to think otherwise but thought it important to state). I greatly appreciate such dialogue and hope it results in someone (myself included) changing their mind, or at least take serious their line of thinking, if the evidence or support for such thinking is simply not there. However, I realize that such a thing might never happen, mainly due to our human depravity, but a guy can still dream right? I hope that this serves as an encouragement to you and for you to not forget the follies or struggles that we go through and through the power of Christ can be overcome.
Now for my formal response:
Alex,
Your claim that I am commenting the logical fallacy of equivocation is illogical. Now, for me to be guilty of equivocation I would have to be using a word or phrase in two different ways. In other words, the conclusion that I make is false, based upon the fact that I shifted the meaning of a word or phrase. But I never did such a thing. Sufficient reason always meant that when you have it you have the result, and determinism means that your choice was sure or fixed. Perhaps, you seeing it as equivocation is because you ascribe a meaning to determinism or sufficient reason or cause that is different than mine, but again this does not mean that my argument is guilty of equivocation, but only that your understanding of certain terms are different than mine.
Before I interact with your understanding of determinism and sufficient reason, I would like to provide further clarification. You said, “[Nick] [y]ou want to say that any sort of “causally sufficient reason” represents a kind of determinism- such a reason “determines” my actions or choices.” Well not exactly man. Allow me to explain this one more time. What I want to say is that there is a conditional relationship or implication between sufficient causal reasons and determinism (see Hurley for the meaning of conditional statement as that you can see that I am not making this up). I mentioned that distinction earlier and by me saying that there is a conditional relationship or implication between the two does not mean that one represents the other or one is the other. All it means is that conditionally when you have the first it implies the later. Look a few comments back to see my fuller treatment on the matter.
Now your claim that S and S only is the cause of S doing x is the exact thinking or understanding I had and thank you for clarifying it. Now, if S and S only is the cause of S doing x, then you cannot appeal to any outside or external reason or cause. S is independent and does not need such outside factors. This is crucial as I move into the randomness charge. Even given your light determinism, you only have necessary causes, so why didn’t S lightly determine not x? Do you see how the randomness charge works? S and S alone only gives you reasons for, because S could have self determined not x.
Sure, your will, emotion, desires, values, ect. are a part of who you are; however, for you to still hold to indeterminism or libertarianism, saying that my choice is not sure or fixed given certain and only necessary reasons or causes, is then to imply that you could act contrary to who you are. I mentioned this earlier, but it’s good to mention it again so that the point is clearly and further expressed. Therefore, under such a notion, the things you mentioned about the soul choosing and determining on its own are irrelevant, because you could have acted differently than what you choice and implies acted differently than who you are. On the other hand, I think that the compatibalist has a more meaningful appeal to our will, emotion, desires, ect. as influencing what we do, because we cannot act outside of such characteristics, and the libertarian implies that we can act outside such characteristics. To clarify this a little more, the point here is not that you would ever claim that you could act outside of your will, or who you essential are, but that your view of freedom logically implies it.
ReplyDeleteAlso, such characteristics are a part of who you are in forming what you do, but they only give you reasons for do something and not reasons why because you could have done otherwise. What I mean here is that S choice x but could have (under the libertarian notion) really choice not x. Again, this is the randomness charge: Since S could have done otherwise, S’s choice is at least partial random.
Now God is not the only external cause out there. Your desires, values, gut-feelings, ect. are all outside or external causes, and for you to claim that you don’t have any outside causes would be false. I noticed that you grated me this point and I think that’s a start as we move to clearly understanding parts of the randomness charge. Now you have made a helpful distinction when you say that these things are a part of who you are, but who has ever said they weren’t. The charge is not that you have acted in accordance with who you are, but that you could have acted in accordance with who you were or are not. Now if you are saying that you are couldn’t act contrary to who you essential are, then I would suggest the compatibalistic understanding which asserts that very fact, and claims that we are free because we act in accordance with would we are. There is no imposing on our will, because our will is action in accordance with who we are and couldn’t have done otherwise. I’ll talk more about this in a second, when I address part of Ryan’s comments.
Now your distinction between the meanings of determinism is irrelevant if you hold to libertarianism. If you are implying a form (broad or narrow) of determinism, then you are do not hold to the libertarian understanding of freedom, because S and S only is and can only be the cause of x. Now your claim that the soul is transcendent and grows out of the temporal self over time is pretty weird man. In other words, I find it to be quite mystical and science fictional. But Alex, I’m afraid that these claims still do not escape the infinite regression claim, because what promoted the soul to even do such a thing? Is it some sort of demiurge? Where does that come from? You see how you must have an unmoved mover. If you don’t you cannot speak meaningfully about your actions or choices since they don’t have any beginning or start within time, and neither a definite or truly transcendent, unmoved mover cause. Also, neither has the problems of interactionism (the immaterial interacting with the material) been completely escaped. There is no logical way to explain how sounds and colors are alike (this is just an illustration). So there is no way to explain how two things completely different from one another (properties mainly) can interact. Even J.P. Moreland (an interactionist) has to bit the bullet on that (Dr. Cowan has informed me of this so if you would like to know where he (Moreland) discusses this it might be helpful to look at his philosophy text, written with Craig, in order to find his discussion on the matter), and I don’t find such a “brute fact” that convincing. Given this, I would like to again suggest the occasionalist understanding as it has some excellent benefits here. Also, I find it interesting that you have not offered any critique of it (this does not mean that there are none out there), but only to say that I somehow equated it with compatibalism, which I tried demonstrate was a misunderstanding.
ReplyDeleteNow your interaction with my final argument is great! But I’m afraid it is also mistaken. Under your sense (or understanding) of an external factor which determines an action, you say that equivalence between sufficient reason and determinism is false. Well, again as I’ve demonstrated, these are not equivalent statements but conditional statements, which imply a relationship between the two (see Hurley on this distinction, as I’ve given you the page numbers in a previous post in hopes of showing you that I am not making this up either). You then said that, ““If my choice is determined, there would be a causally sufficient reason for it.” But the implication of this is that there could be things that are causally sufficient reasons that are not external determinism.” Ok. If you claim that the soul is a sufficient reason and in fact not an external determining factor in decision making then why do you hold to libertarianism?: Which claims that there are no sufficient causes for S choosing x, since S must have the ability to equally or freely do not x. Do you see how you are implying a form of determinism in order to give meaning to your choices and thus respond to my randomness charge? Also I’ve pointed out, if you still wish to claim that the external desires, values, ect., which press on the identity of the soul, are not sufficient causes for S doing x, then you have only provided reasons for and not reasons why S doing x, since S is still free to do not x. Why did S do x rather than not x? Again, this is the randomness implication. Now whether this (you could have done otherwise) is your main point or not (the red herring claim) it is irrelevant as it is a huge implication for and basis of libertarianism and for you to simply dismiss such a problem as not the main point is simply beside the point and frankly not true. In other words, it is a huge problem for you whether you think it is or not, as your system is built upon such thinking. S is free, if and only if, S can freely and equally do x or not x.
Perhaps you are still not satisfied, and I perhaps have misunderstood your clarification and/or I am still not satisfied with your response and I guess that satisfaction can only come through time and thoughtful and meaningful contemplation (from both sides, not and never excluding myself). In conclusion, I feel that logically I have provided further clarity as to the soundness of premise (2), and I’m afraid the validity of the randomness claim still stands. We can still talk about this, but also what do you think of my first argument?
ReplyDeleteRyan,
Great comments and you deserve all the kindness I can offer you; however, I must respectfully disagree with you on many points. I know we’re both used to such a thing so what I am about to say will not come as a great surprise or shock to you.
Your red herring claim holds no water. S (under a libertarian understanding) decided to do x, all the while implying that they could equally have done not x. Your reason for attempting to and insisting on saying that this is a red herring eludes me, because your view of freedom is based upon such thinking of freedom. There is no way that I am leading anyone off track on this point (definition of red herring), for it is the basis of the point(s) you make. In other words, S could have equally done not x even though S did x. Now I will say that the compatibalist is fine with saying S could have done not x even though S did x, given a sufficient reason. It is at this point that the libertarian understanding is question begging, because it presupposes that S had libertarian freedom and thus presupposing or assuming that S could truly possess the ability to equally do not x even though S did x.
Also, no will is being imposed on anyone. This is a common misconstrue of compatibalism. In other words, this is a common straw man since this is a weak construe and presentation of the compatabilist system and understanding of the relationship between freedom and sufficient reason and indirect determinism. Look back to my presentation of compatibalism for a fuller treatment of the relationship between sufficient causes, indirect determinism and the freedom of the will. Perhaps such a misunderstanding is again based upon presuppositions that free will can only mean what libertarianism claims it mean, and if it does not than a will must be imposed upon when it is indirectly determined. Also, the libertarian presupposition of course begs the question if it actually works logically and I’ve tried to demonstrate how it can be reasonably rejected.
Also, your comments concerning the implications of compatibilism on theology proper are more than valid and sound, but a little off topic and this is a prime example of a red herring (see Hurley, 122-23) if you claim to attack the former in light of or based upon the later. Now I know you don’t wish to do so, but I find it important to point out that we are not talking about my thinking in another arena, but my thinking in this arena (the nature of human freedom). Also, this is a good example of how the later is not the former (and visa versa), but how one has implications on another one. On a side note, the motivation for my understanding is not based upon my own theology proper, but because it gives meaning to why we do what we do, as the libertarian understanding implies at least partial randomness and arbitrariness, and this has huge implications for morality and human responsibility.
Moreover, I find it interesting that you last stated or at least implied that human beings are responsible for their actions only in a libertarian framework. This of course begs the question as it presupposes that it gives meaning and responsibility to human actions. Note that the main force of the randomness charge is that implies that the human agent is not responsible or questions their irresponsibility since the reason why S does anything is at least partially random and arbitrary. If you look back to my presentation of indirect determinism, it seems to be the most reasonable and logical understanding that gives the human agent the responsibility you wish to ascribe to our actions. But all of this is not our purpose for this dialogue, and we can talk about this more fully on a later date.
ReplyDeleteI am so thankful and grateful that you have invested time (within your busy schedule) to read my blog and share your thoughts. Let’s keep it up! Now for the bad news, I am afraid that these will be my last comments on this thread for quite some time. My school work is becoming a burden as I attempt to continue writing so much here all the while doing the former. I will also close the thread for some time, so that I don’t feel obligated to keep responding; however, I will let you know when I have reopened it. I am truly sorry about this, but I don’t feel too bad since both of you have blogs of own which you can use as outlets for your further contemplation, responses to what I’ve said here, and further reasons for why you think I’m wrong. Like I’ve said in the past, I am a second rate theologian on my best day, and I guess a no rate philosopher any day, so thank you for your kindness and patience as we discuss such difficult matters. Finally, know that your comments, rhetorical and tone have been highly respectful and professional, and I thank you for that.
Be Blessed,
Nick