A Philosophical and Theological Query: The Problem of Religious Language

I have an extremely limited ability to do theology within a philosophical framework; however, I cannot stop from dabbling in the art and so I'm going to make another attempt at doing so. Lately, I have questioned and debated combating theories of God. Within certain debates, specific pondering concerning the notation of human limitation (whether it’s expressed through our experiences, knowledge, language, etc.) has numerously emerged from the crevasse of my mind. For, as we approach theology proper, in an effort to provide an explanation of who he is, we must address the reverse side of the coin: Who are we? Therefore, in this post I would like to primarily focus on the limitation of human language as it endeavors to speak meaningfully about the nature of God.  

Given God’s divine and infinite personage, character, nature or properties, and the finite qualities that we (as humans) possess, what are the philosophical dangers of assessing God (or epistemologically speaking, knowing what God is like) given our recognition that God is transcendent and not a material being as we are? Such a question is basically raising the philosophical problem of religious language.  Specifically, how adequate is human language to communicate truth about God to us? The first danger we must avoid is creating God in our own image, a form of idolatry, in that our language is exactly reflecting who God is. On the other hand, the other danger we face, in trying to avoid the first one, being so careful to not bring God down to our level, we make it impossible for him to reveal himself to us and thus deny the ability we have to speak meaningfully about him. In other words, we impose on God a limitation in HIS ability to communicate since he is so “wholly other” (the Barthian understanding of God).  We must avoid both errors, as God makes it clear in Scripture that he has revealed himself both in nature and in Scripture. God says he is able to make his nature and will known to us—so we cannot believe that the philosophical questions we’re asking are insurmountable without doubting what Scripture says about the matter (as well as assuming, without clear warrant, that God just cannot adequately communicate and we cannot know him adequately). 

Before I provide a direct response to the problems listed above, I find it interesting and important to note two Christian doctrines that give us hope in explaining why and how it’s possible for God to speak to us adequately. First, there is the doctrine of the imago dei, the idea that we are created in God’s image. We are like him in significant ways, and for our purposes, this means that we need not be hindered by Barthian pronouncements that God is “wholly other.” A Christian cannot say that and be consistent with the biblical teachings that we are the image of God and that God himself has revealed himself to us both in nature and in the Word. Yes, God is “other”, even drastically other, but he is not wholly other. Secondly, there is the doctrine of the incarnation in which God himself takes on flesh to be one of us. The incarnation reinforces what the imago dei teaches, that though God is greatly different from us, transcendent to all created things, he is nevertheless not so different that he cannot enter into human time and space as one of us and “exegete” God for us (John 1:18). 

All of this implies, contra the Barthian notion, that there is an analogy of being between God and us.  Though we are different than God, we are similar in some important ways.  Our being and nature is not exactly the same as God’s, but it is analogous to God’s. And this analogy of being provides the basis for meaningful God-talk and an adequate divine revelation to man. As you might know, there are three ways to construe religious language. First it might be understood univocally—i.e., our words mean exactly the same thing when predicated of God as they do when predicated of creatures. Of course, this view is impossible to reconcile with the serious differences between us and God.  When I say that “God speaks,” I can’t mean exactly the same think as when I say “Nick speaks” because God has no lips and no vocal cords. Secondly, we might understand religious language equivocally such that my words have completely different meanings when applied to God. But this leads to a radical skepticism about God since I can’t have any idea what my words mean when applied to God. Thirdly, Christian theologians and philosophers have typically defended the notion that God talk is analogical—my words don’t have exactly the same meaning when applied to God, but they don’t have a completely equivocal meaning either.  Rather, they have a similar, analogical meaning.  So, e.g., when I say, “God speaks,” I’m not saying that God does exactly the same thing that Nick does when he speaks, but I’m saying that God does something analogous to what Nick does when he speaks.  This seems to me to give us what we want and allows is to steer a middle course between idolatry and skepticism. Therefore, we can have genuine and adequate (though incomplete) knowledge of him, given the possibility of analogical God-talk. On a completely unrelated note, my reference to myself in the third person is like “The Jimmy” episode of Seinfeld. If you haven’t seen it, then I highly recommend you watch it!

I know that I have not exhaustively dealt with this subject matter in great detail, but only wished to introduce my thoughts on the limitations of our talk of God. But perhaps our starting point, ourselves and our language, might still result in an idealized humanity; however, we have no other place to start since all we have is our limitations, and is it possible that God uses such limitations to communicate to us something about himself without misrepresenting himself? Yes, he certainly can and does! If analogical language is possible (and it seems clear to me that it is), then God can reveal himself to us incompletely, partially, perhaps even vaguely, but nevertheless truthfully and adequate to our needs. We avoid an “idealized humanity” because we realize that God-talk is merely analogical, not univocal. And yes, we can know at least some of God’s essential properties or characteristics, and no, we cannot have direct experiential knowledge of God’s essence—“No man can see God and live”—that’s why we need the mediation of the incarnate Christ.  He gives us an indirect glimpse at God’s essence.

I would like to conclude with a helpful list of a few highly recommended resources on the matter. Enjoy and let me know what you think.

Huffman and Johnson, eds. God Under Fire (Zondervan).

Geisler and Corduan, Philosophy of Religion, 2^nd ed. (Baker).

J.I. Packer, “The Adequacy of Human Language” in Inerrancy, ed. Geisler (Zondervan).

2 Corinthians 5:19-21, Imputation, and the Divine Declaration

Over the last few years, biblical and theological investigations into the meaning of imputation have produced an increasing amount of literature, which is rather overwhelming at times if you ask me. I first began to examine the subject a couple of years ago (my last semester at SEBC), and as of recently, according to a divine appointment, I am taking a class on justification here at GCTS where the issue and meaning of imputation is closely connected. Therefore, you have to thank class notes and required reading for this posting and I hope you enjoy it.

The growing interest concerning imputation is due to recent controversies regarding the New Perspective on Paul (NPP), which views the matter much differently than it had been previously. Therefore, without interacting directly with that modern understanding, I would simply like to express some thoughts I have on the topic, which will hopefully give cause to either affirmation, constructive disagreement and conversation in order that further details and reasons for alternate persuasions can be brought forth and evidence weighed. Lastly, you will find me assuming a great deal here, but the assumptions are intentional and where the comments so lovely enter the picture. 

Let’s jump right into it! I understand imputation within the traditional evangelical view of a great exchange taking place between Christ and humanity. That is, I view our sins being imputed to Christ who pays our penalty on the cross, and Christ’s righteousness being imputed to us. On a side note, I know that I have assumed a particular model of the atonement, and again due to another divine appointment, I am taking a class on the atonement as well and would be delighted in discussing this issue further.

Now concerning the details of the great exchanged (as mentioned above), I find 2 Corinthians 5:19-21 to be of great benefit. There is much to be commented on in these short three verses, but for a conversation starter I will restrict my comments to the verses that follow, which seem to be most relevant for our present discussion: “[I]n Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself by not counting their trespasses against them. . .he made the one who did not know sin to be sin on our behalf, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God.”

Before I remark on the language of the exchange, I would like to make a quick observation or two in order to establish a foundation before I move forward. First, the world is the object of God’s reconciliation, and can be summed up by his canceling of the sinner’s debt (cf. Col. 2:13-14). The method of doing so is through the person and work of Christ (2 Cor 5:19), as Christ was made a representative for sinners just as Adam was a representative for humanity (cf. Rom 5:12-21; 1 Cor 15:21-22), which results in the sinner becoming the righteousness of God. Quickly, the semantics of my statements that ‘God’s object of reconciliation is the world’ and ‘Christ is a representative of sinners’ might suggest a change of mind. However, for those who know me too well, I would like to affirm that such a tragedy has not befallen me as I am still a card carrying Calvinist (or Biblicist, hahaha). My apologies to some, and to others rest assured that the phraseology does not indicate a change from good thinking ;) and only gives us more questions to contemplate and answers to communicate.     

Now as I move onto the language of the exchange, I must first address a linguistic issue of the text. Namely, God is “not counting” our sins against us and Christ is being “made” a sinner, rather than being “counted as” a sinner. In other words, the counting is applied in one direction (humanity) and missing in the other (Christ); however, I find a certain consistency in the passage, which suggests that the exchange has the same conceptual elements working in both directions. Namely, our unrighteousness is counted towards Christ and Christ’s is righteousness counted towards us.

Given such a statement, the burden for me is to explain how the elements of the exchange work. In order to do so, I will quickly restate the parts of the exchange: Our sins are counted (in some way and I’ll explain further in a second) towards Christ (“He [was] made…to be sin”), and Christ’s righteousness (“the one who did not know sin”) is counted towards us (“to be sin on our behalf”). Now you might be rightly asking, “How does the first part of the exchange work?” In other words, if Christ was only made sin, then how can I claim that our sins were counted towards Christ (remember that the language of counting is missing in that direction)? Well, it seems likely to view it as our sins being transferred and thus they are “counted” as belonging to Christ. But again you might ask, “How does this transferring work?” In conceptualizing such a transfer, it seems logical to understand it as counting something for what it is not (i.e. exchange) rather than understanding it as counting something for what it is (i.e. recognition). Furthermore, in order to provide greater explanation, the language of “forensic” rather than “transformative” enters into the discussion. If the judgment is “forensic” or God declaring something to be what it is not, then the notion that how our sins are counted to Christ finds its explanation and logical support. Therefore, it cannot be “ethical” or God recognizing something for what it is, because Christ was not sinful.

Now the explanation of later element of the exchange (Christ’s righteousness counted towards us) follows quite nicely. In the same fashion as our sins were counted to Christ, so too was his righteousness counted to us. In other words, it was transferred to us as Christ is our representative and brings about the effect or result of one becoming the righteousness of God. This is the traditional evangelical view of imputation: God declares something to be what it is not (i.e. forensic imputation) in both cases (Christ and humanity), as he reconciles the world back to him through the person and work of Christ, resulting in the person becoming the righteousness of God.  

I will conclude with a comment concerning this divine declaration or action that one is just who is not just. First of all, such an action is a gracious one, and implies that God grants us just even though we were unjust. Moreover, God counts someone righteous despite who they are, and on the basis of who he is by definition (Rom 4:5, 17). Once more, God’s divine activity is the basis for this counting, not the activity (i.e. faith) of the unrighteous. Again it is not an ethical issue, or God recognizing something for what it is, but a gracious issue based upon a divine prerogative (Rom 9: I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy). In other words, I find there to be no injustice upon God concerning this act or declaration. Also, the forensic understanding of imputation is helpful as it gives further clarity to the justice of God's action or declaration.

This should do for now, as I know that this shot across the bough will give my opponents more than enough cause to fire back. The NPP has much to say about all of these issues, so it would be good to hear them. Lastly, I know that I’ve made mention to some side and irrelevant issues, so for now let’s try to discuss matters regarding the 2 Cor text, imputation, and justice or injustice of God, and then move onto my snide remarks (hahaha).

Be Blessed,

Nick