Recently, I engaged in a blog conversation with Alex Marshall concerning the soundness of a particular philosophical argument for the existence of God: namely the kalam cosmological argument. The focus of the kalam is the assertion that there must be a first or originating cause of the universe. In light of reintroducing this subject, here is a brief overview of the kalam’s goal:
- Establish that the universe had a beginning.
- Show that the beginning of the universe had a cause.
- Show that the cause of the beginning of the universe is God.
Also, here are a few (logical valid) kalam arguments. William Lane Craig’s seems the simplest and easiest to remember:
- Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
- The universe began to exist.
- Therefore, the universe has a cause.
And here is another one:
- Everything that comes into existence has an originating cause.
- The material universe came into existence.
- Therefore, the material universe has an originating cause.
I like it because it is a little more detailed than Craig’s argument as it states “originating cause” within the premises.
Now one of Alex’s objections to the logical soundness of the kalam was David Hume’s notion of causation. To elaborate on Hume’s (and Alex’s) objection, suppose Hume’s famous billiard illustration. One is naturally inclined to believe that the cue ball will cause the eight ball to move. But as Hume points out, how does one know this? Actually, all one observes is two distinct events or actions: action A (the cue ball collides with the eight ball) and action B (the eight ball’s subsequent motion). Therefore, one cannot know that A caused B unless one can also observe or otherwise discover a “necessary connection” between these events. One certainly does not observe a necessary connection, so all one has seen or observed is events A and B. (Also, neither can we know something apart from experience [or a priori].) Furthermore, what one has observed is simply that an A event or action is followed by a B event, but simply observing a past experience cannot establish a necessary causal connection between events A and B. Why not? Because we have no reason to think that the future will be like the past. For it is possible that God could fiddle with the laws of nature over night and then in the morning A events no longer cause B events.
Armed with Hume’s epistemological understanding of causation, Alex rejects the “virtually undeniable” assertion of premise 1, since no one can prove that whatever comes into existence has a cause. However, there seems to be an assumption with Hume’s epistemological understanding of causation. That is, it assumes that one needs absolute certainty to prove that whatever comes into existence has a cause (premise 1). However, I don’t need absolute certainty concerning causal relationships in order to possess certain knowledge about the soundness of premise 1. That is, there seems to be levels of certainty (i.e. certainty beyond a reasonable doubt, or more probable than not certainty) that can provide me with enough reason to claim knowledge concerning the claim of premise 1. For this reason, the soundness of premise 1 seems unfazed by Hume’s epistemological understanding of causation.
I don't know that Hume would claim that you need absolute certainty to "know" something. I don't think he even has to go this far for his argument to work. What Hume is asking is simply this: on what basis do we claim to know that the billiard ball will move? Where does this belief even come from, that we could consider it knowledge? And Hume thinks, in considering this question, that he can rule out experience/observation (we don't see a necessary connection) and he can rule out logical necessity and he can rule out any claim that the past is a reliable predictor of the future. Therefore, he concludes, our only basis for claiming that the ball will move is a "customary expectation." We expect it to move, probably based on past experience. Its a custom we teach ourselves. Hume, eventually, thinks this is fine for practical living but it can't count as knowledge. This doesn't have to do with "absolute certainty"- Hume's conclusion is that we have no basis at all for the belief and we only believe it because we are trained (by custom) to believe it. So if causation is merely a "customary belief" we teach ourselves but not something that we have any basis for actually believing is true, then it would seem we can't make the claim it is "more certain than not." It is not certain at all, I would think.
ReplyDeleteHume is providing that illustration in order to demonstrate that one cannot have knowledge with absolute certainty concerning the causal linkage between two events. Therefore, one cannot have knowledge about the event. However, there are different degrees of certainty, and based upon that I can rest assured knowing with certainty beyond a reasonable doubt that an A event will cause a B event. Or for our purposes, the cue ball will always cause the 8 ball to move. Therefore, with certainty beyond a reasonable doubt, whatever comes into existence has a cause. It is in this manner that Hume's epistemological understanding of causation does not faze the soundness of premise 1.
ReplyDeleteHere's a few more thoughts. Just because I cannot prove with a particular degree of certainty that there is a necessary causal connection between two events, that doesn't mean that there is not a causal connection. Also, you seem to think that more probable than not certainty is not enough to establish knowledge of a causal connection between God and the beginning of the universe. First, certainty beyond a reasonable doubt provides me with more than enough epistemological certainty in order to claim knowledge. For any shred of doubt would be unreasonable according to the definition of this level of certainty. Next, you're right to question whether more probable than not can provide one with enough evidence to claim knowledge. However, even though there is significant evidence for the proposition to be false, there is higher probability that it is true. Now we should not quickly claim knowledge according to this level of certainty, yet, at the same time, it seems that we have an obligation to believe it according to it's higher probability.
ReplyDeleteLastly, Hume's treatment of causation concerning the cue and the 8 ball is pretty weak. It's not just that causation is something that is culturally taught to us, but something that can be established by certain laws of nature and scientific methods.
ReplyDeleteQuick disclaimer: I am not Hume. I think Hume is only partly right, but my solution to Hume's problem is not one I think you'd like, so I haven't delved into it. I am rehearsing Hume's argument but I don't necessarily buy Hume's conclusions.
ReplyDeleteTwo thoughts:
First, to restate my original response, I think the "more probable than not" certainty defense misses the point of what Hume is saying. Hume has systematically eliminated possible sources of information- observation, logical necessity, inference from past experience- as our basis for believing in causation. He concludes our belief is based solely on custom. Now I don't think Hume ever entertains the notion of "more probable than not" certainty, I think that's a relatively new innovation in epistemology. But I think he could respond to that fairly succinctly by simply asking "why do you think a belief based solely on custom is more probable than not?" It would seem to me that "custom" is not a very strong basis for a belief in terms of probability. So I don't think that response solves Hume's dilemma.
Second, Hume is not unaware of science. He is writing after Newton and Locke's empirical theories of the universe and directly critiquing them. My understanding is that for the most part science has more or less ignored Hume. But I'm not sure I buy that move by science. I think Hume's critiques of science warrant a response and finding an adequate one has proved particularly difficult.
Before I post another comment, perhaps you could explain in greater detail why you are not convinced by the proofs of nature and science which establish an epistemological basis for the causal connection between A and B? Over against Hume's customary epistemological basis of course.
ReplyDeleteI'm not sure what proofs you mean. Science operates on the assumption of causation- if there are no "causes" then science is pretty meaningless. Hume, as best I understand him, is calling the very assumption on which science operates into question. To use a theory (i.e., a natural law) from science which is itself based on the assumption of causation to argue for causation seems to me like arguing in a circle. My reading of this is not that science has tried to disprove Hume via. natural laws but that science has just continued as if Hume never presented a challenge to the assumption of causation on which it depends. But if Hume's argument is valid, then this move by science is not.
ReplyDeleteGood point. Thank you for clarifying that. Okay, for argument’s sake, let’s for now set aside scientific evidence and suppose that Hume’s skeptical empiricism is correct; however, I’m afraid that it’s still not enough to overthrow the logical soundness of premise 1 (i.e. whatever comes into existence has a cause). Like I said earlier, just because I cannot claim with any level of certainty that A (i.e. God) caused B (i.e. the universe), that does not mean (nor prove) that A did not cause B. All it means is that S knows that A caused B based upon these sensory impressions (i.e. seeing, hearing, and so forth) and therefore S does not possess knowledge of x (i.e. A and B event) because how can S trust these sensory impressions? In other words, how does S know that x represents “real” x?
ReplyDeleteHowever, does not Hume’s claim here imply a certain level of certainty? That is, a certainty that S can certainly not know x? I think so! You see how Hume’s claim (and also Kant’s for that matter) brakes down? If his point is to disclaim certainty all together, then that would be logical absurd! However, if his point is to disclaim a particular level of certainty (i.e. absolute certainty), then it seems that Hume may have a logically sound point. It is for this reason that I made to distinction between levels of certainty, as it relates to Hume’s epistemological assumptions, and the logical soundness of the kalam.
Now this brings us back to discussing levels of certainty and the logic of the kalam. Again placing science aside, there are many other experiences (or sensory impressions) that belong to S that can provide S with a particular degree of certainty concerning x. For example, (following Craig) how many things does S observe that simply pop into existence from nothing? I would say none...you? Therefore, S (while again withholding absolute certainty) can claim quite reasonably that nothing comes into existence from nothing. If it does, then it is as Craig says “worse than magic.” Also, if one things comes into existence from nothing, then why doesn’t any and everything simply pop into existence from nothing? You see how common everyday sensory impressions can provide S with reasonable certainty of x? As a result of S observing many things coming into existence as a result of something else, then S can easily (and reasonably) claim to know that A caused B. Therefore, based upon sensory experiences, S can reasonably claim (without absolute certainty) knowledge of x.
Perhaps I am still missing your point (as well as Hume’s), so correct or critique any of this as you see fit.
In my humble view (I don't know logic)..
ReplyDeletethe problem with this argument is the biblical creation of the cosmos ex nihilo. It's completely singular.
The law of conservation of energy states that energy and matter can't be created or destroyed. Therefore it's a false comparison to compare the biblical creation of the universe ex nihilo with any other "causation" we know of.
We simply are accustomed to using the word "cause" for two completely different things.
Thank you for your comment. I'm confused about a number of things. My main point of confusion resides in your statement about the biblical notion of creation ex nihilo being "completely singular." Could you explain this a bit more?
ReplyDeleteNow let's see if we can apply your objection to the logic of the kalam argument. Here is the argument once more:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
I don't really know what premise your primarily objecting to, but I'll assume that it's premise 2. You first state "that energy and matter cannot be created or destroyed." However, do you then mean that this material universe always existed? If so, then that would mean that there have been an infinite number of past events prior to today. However, there cannot be an actual infinite number of past events because an actual infinite number of things cannot exist. This is one of the main logical thrusts of the kalam argument.
I welcome more of your thoughts on the matter (even more objections).
Logically complete cosmological concept. /due to lack of knowledge of the English language was not able to correct the translation Implemented by Google/
ReplyDeleteIn order to present the unlimited space originally:
1. homogeneous - enough to postulate the presence in it of two elements with Simple and Complex /closed systematically/
2. heterogeneous - enough to postulate the presence in it of one more element - the Most High and Almighty God - with open systematically.
It is easy to assume that even at the lowest possible deployment of the intangible component of the essence of God - the Spirit of God - for the level of the original downwardly directed the permanent deployment of the material component of the essence of God, there is a curtailment of Simple and Complex /i.e.. It is their decay due to blocking of origin upwardly directed constantly deploy intangible components of the entity / as much as possible heterogeneous to God's essence minimum possible number of cell uniformity (1H), and God on the basis of the material components of the 1H deploys the minimum possible heterogeneous to its essence as possible numerically elemental homogeneity (2H). Coagulation process will begin in 2H known God start time since the completion of its deployment. curtailment of the Spirit of God to the level of initial deployment again unfolds 1H - God potential for transformation 1H into 2H and 1H into 2H limitless!
Logically complete cosmological concept. /due to lack of knowledge of the English language was not able to correct the translation Implemented by Google/
ReplyDeleteIn order to present the unlimited space originally:
1. homogeneous - enough to postulate the presence in it of two elements with Simple and Complex /closed systematically/
2. heterogeneous - enough to postulate the presence in it of one more element - the Most High and Almighty God - with open systematically.
It is easy to assume that even at the lowest possible deployment of the intangible component of the essence of God - the Spirit of God - for the level of the original downwardly directed the permanent deployment of the material component of the essence of God, there is a curtailment of Simple and Complex /i.e.. It is their decay due to blocking of origin upwardly directed constantly deploy intangible components of the entity / as much as possible heterogeneous to God's essence minimum possible number of cell uniformity (1H), and God on the basis of the material components of the 1H deploys the minimum possible heterogeneous to its essence as possible numerically elemental homogeneity (2H). Coagulation process will begin in 2H known God start time since the completion of its deployment. curtailment of the Spirit of God to the level of initial deployment again unfolds 1H - God potential for transformation 1H into 2H and 1H into 2H limitless!