In an earlier post, I made the suggestion that some libertarians are guilty of being inconsistent if they hold to a certain cosmological argument for God's existence. The cosmological argument I have in mind is the kalam cosmological argument. However, amongst the responses a friend was more than willing to reject this version because he felt it had too many presuppositions built into it. Therefore, what I would like to do here is lay out the three premises of the argument, and in hopes of defending it provide proof for the inconsistency of the libertarian.
First of all, here are the premises:
1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
Quickly notice that the argument is quite simple and easy to remember. Also notice the argument's validity and soundness. For if one was to reject the conclusion (premise 3), then he/she must prove either premise 1 or 2 to be false because the conclusion necessarily follows from the two premises. Lastly, notice the direction the argument is going in. Namely, the universe must have a beginning, and since nothing begins to exist without a cause, there must be a transcendent creator of the universe.
So this is the question and challenge for the libertarian: Either what reasons do you have to reject this argument? Or how do you account for such validity and soundness and still claim that your actions, which have come into existence, have no transcendent cause?
Nice post, Nick! Let me elaborate on my critique of the Kalam arguments presuppositions:
ReplyDeleteMy problem with the argument is with the claim that the argument is "sound." Do you know for certain that the universe had a beginning? Do you know for certain that all things which begin to exist must have a cause? David Hume would outright reject your first premise, I think. And many, many physicists and astronomers would reject the second one (take Stephen Hawking after he changed his mind on the Big Bang as one prominent example). So the argument is certainly valid, no dispute of that. But before you can claim soundness, you need to prove both of those premises to be true (not just logically possible). Which is what I mean by "presuppositions" built into the argument. If someone accepts your account of causation and your account of the universe's origin, then the argument works. If they don't accept one or the other of those premises, though, then the argument doesn't work at all.
This is my general critique of much of "classical" apologetics in general. I think what this argument establishes is that the claim that there is an "original cause" to the universe is logically reasonable/plausible. I don't think that this argument proves that the universe does in fact have an "original cause." Do you see the difference between the two?
Alex, thank you for your comment and I hope you're enjoying New Hampshire. Perhaps I can come visit?
ReplyDeleteNow your questions are helpful in that they bring out some of the presuppositions behind the premises; however your questions alone do not give any real reason for rejecting the premises. So, I think that I'll provide some basic support for each premise (responding to the questions you set forth) and this will provide you with some data to respond to.
Let's start with premise 1: whatever begins to exist has a cause. Also keep in mind your question: "Do you know for certain that all things which begin to exist must have a cause?"
First this premise seems "virtually undeniable for any sincere seeker after truth" (quoting Craig). For something to come into being without a cause means that something came into being from nothing. This is completely absurd! For something to come from nothing is "worse than magic" (again quoting Craig). When the magician pulls a rabbit out of his hat at least the magician has the hat. "Nothing comes from nothing; nothing ever could." (this is a most delightful quote of Maria in The Sound of Music). So one reason that supports the soundness of premise 1 is that something cannot come from nothing.
Another reason that supports premise 1 is that if something can come from into being from nothing, then it becomes inexplicable why just anything or everything doesn't come into being from nothing. This one seems rather self explanatory so I'll currently leave it at that.
Lastly, one more reason to think that premise 1 is clearly true is that common experience and scientific evidence confirms the truth of premise 1.
Now premise 2: the universe began to exist. Now your question is "Do you know for certain that the universe had a beginning?"
ReplyDeleteThis does seem to be the more philosophically controversial premise; however you provide no argument or reason to reject it. Therefore, it's hard for me to specifically respond to an objection and as result I'll leave it to you to provide a reason(s) for rejecting the soundness of premise 2.
So, it seems for now that we still have good reason to believe that the universe began to exist, and since whatever begins to exist has a cause then it follows that the universe has a cause.
I would like to conclude with drawing everyone's attention to the challenge for the libertarian. Along similar lines of logic concerning the kalam argument, if the universe cannot be self-caused (contra the nonsense of atheist philosopher Daniel Dennett), neither can our action (which again have come into existence). The universe must have an unmoved mover transcendent cause, and so must our actions. This seems quite the logical assertion if the logic of the kalam argument is sound (primarily that of premise 1).
New Hampshire is lovely! You can certainly come visit, though we will be very busy excepting our 24-hours off each weekend (noon Sat-noon Sunday).
ReplyDeleteI think Craig is being too simplistic in his reasoning. Would he simultaneously affirm that "something cannot come from nothing" and that God created ex nihilo? How does he make those fit together? Further, I don't think Craig has in any way dealt with David Hume by merely asserting that his account of causation seems "virtually undeniable." Hume at least purported to be a sincere seeker of truth who raised serious questions about our commonsensical notions of cause and effect. To my knowledge, nearly 250 years later, no one has solved Hume's puzzles. Craig's assertion just doesn't work as a proof.
Their are many arguments against the second premise. I didn't provide a specific one, but we might take the string-theory model of the universe's existence as such an example. Or Aristotle's original account of the unmoved mover, which maintained that the universe had existed eternally. Or any other of a number of similar arguments. My point is not so much to overturn the premise (on most days I think I would say I believe the universe has a beginning...). My point is to say that there are many well-founded alternative views and so we have to argue for this premise before we can use it as a "proof." It can't be assumed.
To briefly touch on your libertarian challenge- I have alluded to this before. The libertarian can maintain that we have a transcendent cause for our actions. It just happens that said transcendent cause is (at least in some instances) our own self and not another being/entity.
I so enjoyed reading that. So to first answer your question: “Would he [Craig] simultaneously affirm that "something cannot come from nothing" and that God created ex nihilo? How does he make those fit together?” Now I’m not for sure how Craig would answer it, but it doesn’t seem that one cancels out the other. Creatio ex nihilo means that God created the universe out of nothing, not that the universe was created out of nothing by nothing. Therefore, the fact that something cannot come from nothing, which is one supporting reason for the soundness of premise 1 of the kalam, is not affected by creatio ex nihilo.
ReplyDeleteNext you stated that you “don't think Craig has in any way dealt with David Hume by merely asserting that his account of causation seems "virtually undeniable." Hume at least purported to be a sincere seeker of truth who raised serious questions about our commonsensical notions of cause and effect. To my knowledge, nearly 250 years later, no one has solved Hume's puzzles. Craig's assertion just doesn't work as a proof.” First, I think that Craig’s rhetoric seems a little unnecessary. Next, I’m not familiar with Hume’s objection, so perhaps you could provide it?
Now onto your arguments against premise 2: the universe began to exist. You mentioned the super-string theory or M-model, but this is an objection to the fine tuning argument of the universe and is not a primary objection to the soundness of premise 2 of the kalam. But for those who don’t know it I’ll set forth the fine tuning argument and address this objection.
ReplyDeleteThe fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.
It is not due to physical necessity or chance.
Therefore, it is due to design.
This argument is indisputably valid, but the question concerning it logical soundness is more difficult matter. Premise 2 seems that it is the most crucial for the soundness of this argument and the super-string theory is a possible objection to it that needs answering. The super-string theory attempts to make a case for physical necessity. So can the universe’s exist (namely cosmic fine-tuning) be explained by physical necessity? The super-string theory claims that the physical universe must be 11-dimensional, but the theory provides no reason for why the universe should possess that exact number of dimensions. So there seems that we have good reason to reject it. For example, “it would require us to say that only one set of constants and quantities is compatible with the laws of nature, which seems false” (Philosophical Foundations, 485.). Moreover, “even if the laws of nature were themselves necessary, one would still have to supply initial conditions” (Ibid.).
Next, I’m glad that you brought up Aristotle's cosmological argument, for I have many questions concerning it. What is God’s relationship to the hierarchy of substances? How does Aristotle’s theory not fall into an infinite regression? I like the idea that the “universe had existed eternally” (since I hold to a timeless God who eternally creates), but that doesn’t mean that the universe didn’t have a beginning.
I know that you believe the universe has a beginning, but I take much enjoyment in responding to the objections. There might very well be “well-founded alternative views” but I’m not currently convinced and so let’s continue to argue for the soundness of premise 1 so that “we can use it as a proof” and not just assume it. I think it’s more fun this way! Right?
Now let’s conclude with my libertarian challenge. Now I know that you and I have tangoed to this number before, but let’s do it again! If a transcendent cause caused the universe (something that came into existence), and whatever begins to exist has a cause, then how can a non-transcendent being bring an action into existence? I have made the case that the same illogical nonsense when implied to the creation of the universe (namely that the universe cannot be created by anything other than a transcendent cause) should be firmly rejected. As a result, what logical grounds do we have to except the notion that our actions, which came into existence, have a non-transcendent cause? You claim that the “libertarian can maintain that we have a transcendent cause for our actions. It just happens that said transcendent cause is (at least in some instances) our own self and not another being/entity.” But this claim is a bit misleading. How can human beings, a finite being, be a transcendent cause? This seems absurd! Also, if the logic and implications of the kalam is sound, then it seems that your theory logically fails.
I think we should call it a salsa instead of a tango... that just sounds more fun to me for some reason... To each their own, though.
ReplyDeleteThe reason I brought up the creation ex nihilo bit was because of the example you attributed to Craig of the magician pulling the rabbit from his hat. Even if the magician didn't have a hat, you still have a magician. So you would have an "agent" seemingly producing an "object" out of "nothing" (complete lack of material to be manipulated). So likewise with creation ex nihilo we have an agent- God- creating an object- the universe- from nothing (complete lack of material to be manipulated). From that perspective, the two cases seem strikingly parallel and I think an easy objection to Craig's argument that something cannot come from nothing is that when he applies this principle to God he is guilty of the fallacy of "special pleading." Why can God do this but the magician cannot? It would seem to me that we already need a notion of who God is before we can make sense of God having this special ability. But God needs this special ability for Craig's argument for God's existence to work. Very quickly we start arguing in a circle and it becomes obvious that we are heavy on presuppositions here.
David Hume's arguments are probably some of the most significant bits of philosophy since the Enlightenment. Hume argues that we cannot demonstrate causation. So the famous example is the balls on a billiard table. We hit the cue-ball and it strikes the 8 ball. What happens next? We assume the 8 ball moves. Why? Because that is what we have seen happen in the past. But can we prove that it will happen in the future? How would we do that? Repeating it over and over again? But each of those instances would then be in the past... how do we guarantee that it will happen in the future. Is there some entity we can observe that is causing the ball to move that would dictate its movement in the future? Hume argues there is not. Is there some logical principle that necessitates that the ball move? Hume argues there is no such principle. At the end, Hume concludes we cannot know anything about causation. Our notion of causation is merely a product of "habit" or "custom" in our expectations/perceptions, but not any sort of actual "necessity."
The aspect of string theory I wished to highlight was its maintaining that the universe is eternal/has no beginning. My point in brining up that theory and the older Aristotelian cosmological argument is that both arguments account for the universe's existence while denying premise 2 of your argument. That in and of itself is not a claim that premise 2 is wrong but that premise 2 needs to be substantiated. For many extremely intelligent people it does not seem true that the universe must have had a beginning. On what basis, then, can you make the claim that it does? Craig tries to derive premise 2 from a combination of premise 1 and an argument against absolute infinities. What is interesting is that Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle both affirm that absolute infinities are not a problem in the sense that Craig takes them to be, which is largely based on the "apparent" unfathomabiliy of an absolute infinity. But why must that be a problem? Why does our inability to understand how something could happen mean that it actually could not happen? In the end I don't think Craig has a convincing reason for claiming that premise 2 is true in light of many thinkers from ancient times to present day who would have no problem denying it.
ReplyDeleteMy answer about human transcendence is to point to two aspects of the tradition. In more "classical" notions of human self, there is a dualism between the "physical" self and the "spiritual" self- the soul. This soul is essentially a transcendent entity. In some accounts (see Plato or Origen) it exists prior to the creation of the physical self. In others it comes into existence with the physical self, perhaps emerging from it (see Aristotle and Aquinas). In either case, it exists eternally after our death. It cannot be killed. It does not exist on the "physical plain"- it is not a spacial-temporal entity. It is transcendent. Something similar happens in more recent "existential" views of the person. There is the "existential" self and the "actualized" self (or other similar descriptors, such as Karl Rahner's "categorical" and "particular"). The "existential" is a transcendent entity which is actualized in a particular person at a particular time in a particular place. Many of those particulars are "accidental"- we don't choose them. So we have to make the most of them. But what really defines us is the "existential" self- the entity beyond our superficial/accidental trappings which expresses our true character.
In both of these accounts, a human is both finite and infinite, both particular and transcendent. In both of these accounts, the part responsible for the person's "will" is the transcendent part. Our will is a reflection of our soul in the classical account. Our will is both a reflection of and a contributor to our existential self on other accounts. So if our will is seated in this transcendent part of us, why can we not be transcendent causes of our own actions?
Hey Alex,
ReplyDeleteSorry for the late response. It's been pretty crazy trying to finish all my work for this class (and there is still a good bit to do). Given this, my comment is going to be quite short in which I'll primarily deal with your notion of human soul transcendence (because I think we can discuss the logic of the kalam later).
For one I think you're right: the soul is transcendent in that it goes beyond this realm of existence. But perhaps there is another aspect of transcendence, which is ascribed to God as the one who can bring things into existence, when it is applied to the human transcendent soul it would not be true. What do you think?