Divine Sovereignty and Human Responsibility: Reflections on 2 Samuel 24/1 Chronicles 21 and James 1:13-15

Introduction of the Issue. 2 Samuel 24 is an excellent example of the biblical tension between divine sovereignty and human responsibility and their interrelatedness. For one, the text provides little reason for the Lord’s anger against Israel (2 Sam. 24:1a), for the Lord’s incitement (2 Sam. 24:1b), and for why David’s numbering of the people is a sin (cf. 2 Sam. 24:10, 17). [(On a quick side note, a number of answers can be provided for why the Lord was angry and why David’s act of numbering the people is a sin, but I will not provide them here.)] However, what is certain is that David feels morally culpable for his action of counting Israel and Judah (24:10, 17), and surprisingly not less guilty even though God incited him to do it (24:1b). So the language of the text is clear: God punishes men for something that he incites them to do and still there is no moral blame placed on God. So what the reader finds in this text is complete sovereignty of God and absolute moral responsibility of humanity, and the existence of one side of the coin appears to not diminish the other. Now if God truly incited David to sin, how is God not the initiator of a sinful action? How can this be consistent with the teaching of James 1:13-15 that God “never tempts anyone”?

An Inadequate Solution. In an effort to relieve such tension some scholars have appealed to the parallel passage, 1 Chronicles 21. The Chronicler, writing after the exile, records that it was Satan, not Yahweh, who incites David to number the people and thus sin against God. This is cited by some as an example of how Israelite theology evolved over time during the OT period. They would contend that Samuel’s rendering reflects an older, more primitive theology with a less developed concept of God than the Chronicler’s. Given such evident theological development and diversity, some believe that it was Satan, and not God, who must be the one responsible for an apparent moral atrocity. Therefore, the purpose of the change in wording is viewed as an attempt by the Chronicler to protect his more sophisticated understanding of the holiness of God.

However, such an appeal does not help in the matter and only raises more questions and thus problems. If both of these statements (1 Samuel 24:1; 1 Chronicles 21:1) are viewed as carrying divine authority, then it means that there cannot be a conflict or contradiction between them. In other words, the view that the Chronicler’s change reflects an evolution in theology suggests fallible human opinion rather than two divinely inspired statements.

A Better Solution. The tension between these two texts is best resolved by understanding Samuel as speaking from the standpoint of God’s general providential governance of everything that comes to pass through and dominion over all powers and authorities whether in heaven or on earth (cf. Ps. 97:9; Eph. 1:20), while the Chronicler speaks more specifically of Satan as the immediate cause of David’s action. Another way of understanding it is that Samuel provides an underlying theological perspective, while the Chronicler simply describes what happened from a human perspective. Therefore, the exchange of Yahweh for Satan is no more and no less troubling than the situation one finds in the first two chapters of Job. Satan’s power to cause things to happen is dependent on God allowing it in the first place. The Bible teaches that God empowers human beings (cf. Judg. 1:14; Hab. 1:6; Acts 4:28) and even destructive beings (cf. 1 Kgs. 22:19-23; 2 Thess. 2:11) in a limited way to bring about judgment. Therefore, such principles can be applied to our present case: the Lord enabled Satan to entice David to act foolishly in order to bring judgment upon Israel.

Reconciliation with James. How is God’s incitement of David’s sin consistent with the teaching of James 1:13-15 that God “never tempts anyone”? First, keep in mind that 2 Sam 24 makes it clear that God is sovereign and David, not God, is culpable. Next, it is crucial to understand what is meant by temptation. Temptation refers to the internal conceiving and actualizing of sin. So what James seems to be stated is that God is never the internal cause for temptations in the human agent. In this manner the fault for sin lies in how sin is actualized in the agent and has thus corrupted our human nature from the good thing God created. The culpability for our sin is not in the external situation, which we erroneously call ‘temptation’ and what I believe 2 Sam 24 is referring to (i.e. God is the external reason for David’s numbering of the people), but our own sinful desires for things God has either forbidden directly and that cause us to act in our own strength rather than in dependence upon the Lord.

A Philosophical Illustration. I think philosophy can illustrate the logicalness of this biblical distinction. First it seems clear that this text does not teach or support libertarian freedom, that is, the claim that any form of determinism is incompatible with freedom and responsibility. However, the text does seem to support the notion that determinism and responsibility are compatible and it is from this point that many philosophers assert compatibilism as an answer the apparent dilemma.

Next, it is crucial to clarify what I mean by “determinism.” It is far different to say that God directly caused David to act circumventing his deliberative processes (hard determinism), than to say that God indirectly caused David to act and thus did not circumvent his deliberative processes (comaptibilism).

I believe direct [or hard] determinism is false, but I do think it provides indirect determinism or compatibilism with some helpful remarks. If God directly causes David to number the people, he would not be responsible for numbering the people and God would be guilty of causing David to sin. However, this leaves open the possibility that God could cause David to number the people in such a way that does not undermine his deliberative processes and thus responsibility/freedom. We might say that God gave David an intellect that could deliberate on what actions to take in order to reach desired ends. In this more indirect way, God can then externally cause David to number the people without overriding David’s internal faculties, which are part of David’s deliberative processes, and thus does not undermine David’s freedom. David’s action of numbering the people would issue from his own practical reason (i.e. David’s sinful nature and thus natural inclination to sin), and the result of his own deliberations as to what he should do to attain the goals he desires to attain. God would remain sovereign because he is the one who externally created David with the reasons available to David to perform such an act. In other words, God is sovereign because he externally created David, and David is free because he internalized the action in accordance with who he is and/or what he wanted to do.

Epistemology, Causation, and Libertarian Freedom (Once more)

In a previous blog post (http://nicholaslutzo.blogspot.com/2011/07/david-hume-and-kalam-cosmological.html) I discussed the epistemology of David Hume, as result of another blog post (http://nicholaslutzo.blogspot.com/2011/06/kalam-cosmological-argument-and.html) where I discussed the logical soundness premise 1 of the kalam cosmological argument for God’s existence (whatever comes into existence has a cause), and it was from that point that I pointed out libertarian freedom inconsistency in regard to such soundness. The need to discuss Hume’s epistemology was because of Hume’s claim that one cannot know causation. Alex Marshall was willing to point that out, and as a result I attempted to defend the soundness of the metaphysical assertion of premise 1 from the attack of Hume’s epistemology.

However, my arguments were perhaps unnecessary for there is no reason to suggest that these epistemological assertions have any barring on the metaphysics of causation. That is, just because one could not possibly know causation it doesn’t mean that causation does not exist. In fact, I said this multiple times, and now I have found a quote from Hume (thanks to my good fortune of knowing Don Hartley) to back it up. Hume says, “I never asserted so absurd a proposition as that anything might arise without a cause.” Hume, Letters, 1:187. For even Hume believed, despite his epistemological views, that nothing comes into existence without a cause whatsoever!

This now brings me to my final observation of this post. What now for libertarian freedom? If everything that comes into existence has a cause, and our actions comes into existence, then what is the cause of our actions? The kalam argument demands a transcendent cause/unmoved mover (i.e. God) in order to avoid an infinite number of past events because an actual infinite number of things cannot and does not exist. However, libertarian freedom rejects such causation, and holds to agent causation. The challenge then for the libertarian is how is agent causation not guilty of an infinite regress? In response, the libertarian may claim that the soul or will is transcendent and thus able to bring an action into existence; however, I reject such a claim. For one, there are perhaps two different definitions or understandings of transcendence and one is being confused with the other. For one I think that the soul is transcendent in that it goes beyond this realm of existence, but perhaps there is another aspect of transcendence that is ascribed to God as the one who can bring things into existence. It is the later understanding that when applied to the human transcendent soul cannot be true. For one, the libertarian has not proven it to be true and the shortcomings of Interactionism suggest that there is no philosophical reason to think that the immaterial soul or will can and does interact and/or cause a material action. For how could they? When one examines both, one comes away noting how different they are from one another (e.g. one is material, the other immaterial). What do you think?

Answering Questions Concerning the Patristic Trinitarian Controversy

Summary: This post seeks to demonstrate what the patristic Trinitarian controversy was about, and in doing so determine how best to formulate a method for evaluating them. Unfortunately I have decided to do this backwards (and with little detail). Therefore, what you will first read are modern methods of patristic doctrinal formulation, a critique, and lastly my thoughts on what it was truly about. 

What are some of the major perspectives contemporary scholars hold toward patristic Trinitarian doctrinal formulation? How do these perspectives reflect the world views of the scholars, and how have these perspectives influenced us as evangelicals? How do the scholars’ assessments of the central concerns of the controversies compare to the patristic authors’ own statements of their central concerns? 

There are several major contemporary approaches to understanding patristic doctrinal formulation concerning the Trinitarian controversies. The basic approach that influences most every other perspective is the understanding that these controversies are “a clash between two schools, Antioch and Alexandria” (Richard Norris, The Christological Controversies, 23.). Certain contemporary scholars will claim that throughout the controversies the ecumenical councils seemed to go back and forth from one method to the other. In light of this model of modern scholarly discussions of patristic doctrinal formulation, scholars will associate patristic doctrines according to an Antiochian and Alexandrian theological stance. So for example, concerning Trinitarian issues, the Alexandrian school can be identified or recognized by its placement of emphasis on the threeness of God while the Antiochian school places emphasis on the oneness of God (Alister McGrath, Historical Theology: An Introduction to the History of Christian Thought (Oxford: Blackwell, 1998), pp. 61-72; Justo González, A History of Christian Thought, Vol. 1: From the Beginnings to the Council of Chalcedon (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 338-40.)

The catalyst for such a distinction and approach to understanding the Trinitarian controversy seems to be scholars’ primary preference for Western philosophical and logical thinking. Therefore, since it makes more sense to start with the oneness of God and thus favoring the Western method of the Trinity, scholars seem to pass judgment on the Eastern model and frame the controversies in such a manner. So with this perspective of the controversy, some scholars assume that Western philosophy/logic is a more appropriate approach to the matter. Also, this perspective seems to have a great influence on evangelicals today (more thoughts on this are shortly to come.).  

Associated with the schools’ theological emphases, contemporary scholars also approach patristic doctrinal formulation according to an Alexandrian vs. Antiochenian method of biblical interpretation or hermeneutics (See Roger Olson, The Story of Christian Theology, 202-204). It seems that this approach is most influential on modern evangelical scholarship since we seek to follow the more literal or grammatical-historical hermeneutical method. If this perspective is correct, and the Alexandrian school interpreted allegorically and the Antiochenian school literally, then we might have a good reason to claim that the Antiochenian approach is to be favored since they at least interpreted Scripture according to a grammatical-historical method and did not allegorize Scriptural teachings like those Alexandrians did. (I will discuss this further in coming sections.)   

Also, closely related to the schools’ preferred method of interpretation is the contemporary approach to a patristic doctrinal formulation that centers on the issue of terminology. William Rusch is a prime example of a scholar who presupposes that the controversies surrounding the patristic doctrinal formulations were the result of not having a robust, intellectually savvy, and technical vocabulary (The Trinitarian Controversies, 1-2, 6).

It seems that the assumption here is that the Trinitarian and Christological debates/controversies of the early church did not pertain to discussing who the Father, Son and Holy Spirit really were (i.e. God), but how we should talk about the Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Approaching these controversies from the standpoint that modern thinkers use better terminology than patristic authors did is also quite influential and evident in evangelical scholarship. For evangelicals often feel the need to talk about Christ and the trinity in a technical manner (just look at all the terms used in modern systematic theologies- such as Wayne Grudem’s Systematic Theology).       

Another contemporary approach to patristic doctrinal formulation is the assumption that orthodoxy is the result of political maneuvers and thus simply what won out. Bart Ehrman is the classic proponent of such an assumption (See his Lost Christianities and Lost Scriptures). “Orthodoxy” won because of political motives and intrigue, and as a result theology doesn’t matter because it is divorced from Scripture. Ehrman’s presuppositions are quite clear. Given his agnosticism, he tends to speak in terms of winners and losers not right and wrong. It seems that this perspective is quite persuasive to a relativistic and/or skeptical audience, but evangelicals do well to reject such notions and understand that political endeavors encouraged orthodoxy but they never established it.  

What is the most appropriate way to describe the course of these controversies?

First of all, it doesn’t seem appropriate to describe this controversy in an East vs. West manner. There are numerous patristic fathers from both the Eastern and Western tradition who don’t fit exactly into their respective mold. From the theological standpoint, instead of describing the Trinitarian controversy in a three vs. one model we should address it in a Western philosophical model and an Eastern personal model.

The benefit of describing this controversy in such a manner has huge theological implications. For example, while the Western model seems to be more philosophically or logically developed the personal aspects of the Eastern models appeal to the enjoyment of the benefits experienced within the Trinitarian relationship and that Christians will share with the persons of the Godhead. This seems to be what certain patristic authors mean when they talk about being made divine (Athanasius, On the Incarnation (Crestwood: SVS Press, 1977), 39.). It’s not that we will be exactly like God, but that we will share in the benefits and enjoyments of the Trinitarian relationship.

Also, the Western method has the implication of discussing the essence of God as it were a “thing” in addition to the three persons. Furthermore, this essence that each person of the trinity possesses and thus constitutes them as God may lead people to speak of God in an impersonal way (Rusch, Trin. Cont., 1). There, Rusch refers to this God essence as “the divine.”) To explain this a bit more, compare the Western philosophical model with the Eastern personal model and the impersonal implications of the West become clearer. That is, the relationship between the divine essence of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit might lead one to worship a God that is a “thing” and perhaps impersonal; while the East speaks of persons who are equally God and persons of the Godhead who relate with each other. See how the approaches seem starkly different from one another? One goes from speaking of an essence that ties the persons together to discussing the persons of the Godhead who are equally God and relate with each other. It seems that the latter has wonderful implications for Christians as we are to understand ourselves as participating in and enjoying the benefits of that relationship after salvation. Now there are theological burdens with each approach. Namely implications of tritheism with the Eastern model and implications of modalism with the Western model; however, these controversies will not be addressed in great detail at this time.

 In light of this theological distinction, describing the patristic Trinitarian controversies is best done in a manner that is biblically grounded and not philosophically/logically consistency. As some scholars have pointed out, even the heretics focused on using Scripture and describing their perspective in light of the biblical language (Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, Revised and Updated (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2004), 40). Moreover, it’s not that some patristic fathers were not at all concerned with one option or another, but where does he place primary importance? In other words, do biblical and theological studies ever take a back set to philosophy and logic?

Next, these notions of Antiochian vs. Alexandria interpretation seem to be the product of nineteenth-century scholarship and not a reflection of patristic doctrinal formulation (Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, 37-38). Moreover, there are some Alexandrian fathers (e.g. Cyril) who “favored a more grammatically based approach” (Introduction to Biblical Interpretation, 39). Therefore, the line is not as clear as some wish it were. Therefore, since many patristic fathers share a common approach of interpretation, a conclusion can be drawn that asserts that the appropriate way of describe these controversies is not allegorical vs. grammatical-historical interpretation but rather who the Holy Spirit and Jesus Christ are and identifying their nature and function within the trinity. (More on this in the following section.)

Also, it’s best to not describe this controversy in light of terminology. If one considers the issues to be primarily terminological, then the West always comes out looking better, because the Latin terminology was more rigid and therefore easier to use and understand than the corresponding Greek words. Now terminological issues were important to patristic fathers; however, terminology was primarily about the need to clearly define the meaning of certain terms rather than what terms are appropriate and necessary for a Trinitarian discussion. Furthermore, scholars should focus on describing these controversies in a way that reflects what’s at stake if the heretics are correct. (Again, I’ll provide more thoughts on this matter very soon.)

What were the fundamental issues? What was the controversy primarily about? What was ultimately at stake?

It seems that the fundamental issue of the Trinitarian controversy was who the persons of the trinity are (namely the Son and Holy Spirit). Following this issue the controversy was primarily about the possibility and the reality of salvation. In other words, how do Christians understand what the Bible says about both God and salvation? For it seems that the early church talks about these questions in the same manner. That is, the way one talked about God was done in the same manner that one talked about salvation. For who God is and how he saves believers are closely related topics.

Given this theological necessity, these controversies were primarily about the nature and function of the persons of the Godhead. For example, if Christ is divine, then what does it mean and how does it relate to our salvation? In other words, if the primary concern of the controversies were soteriological, then why do modern scholars tend to focus on what God does rather than who God is? For the Son must be God in order to save us, and the Holy Spirit must be God in order to unite us to God. If one looks at the controversies in light of soteriological matters, then the devastating implications of the heretic would be that humanity could not be saved. In other words, if Christ were like Nestorius claimed he was then humanity would have no hope because Nestorius’ savior could not save us. Moreover, if Arius was correct, then Christ could not save us. As I have attempted to illustrate, what is really at stake in this controversy is salvation, and for this reason either side of the debated Trinity implied a saving God or a failing God. For God (or Christ, or HS) has to BE who he is, to DO what he did, to give us the KIND of salvation we have. In other words, the Son had to be God in order to save us (or enable us to achieve salvation), and the Holy Spirit had to be God in order to give us (or enable us to achieve) this kind of salvation.