David Hume and the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Recently, I engaged in a blog conversation with Alex Marshall concerning the soundness of a particular philosophical argument for the existence of God: namely the kalam cosmological argument. The focus of the kalam is the assertion that there must be a first or originating cause of the universe. In light of reintroducing this subject, here is a brief overview of the kalam’s goal:

1. Establish that the universe had a beginning.
2. Show that the beginning of the universe had a cause.
3. Show that the cause of the beginning of the universe is God.

Also, here are a few (logical valid) kalam arguments. William Lane Craig’s seems the simplest and easiest to remember:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause. 

And here is another one:

1. Everything that comes into existence has an originating cause.
2. The material universe came into existence.
3. Therefore, the material universe has an originating cause.

I like it because it is a little more detailed than Craig’s argument as it states “originating cause” within the premises.

Now one of Alex’s objections to the logical soundness of the kalam was David Hume’s notion of causation. To elaborate on Hume’s (and Alex’s) objection, suppose Hume’s famous billiard illustration. One is naturally inclined to believe that the cue ball will cause the eight ball to move. But as Hume points out, how does one know this? Actually, all one observes is two distinct events or actions: action A (the cue ball collides with the eight ball) and action B (the eight ball’s subsequent motion). Therefore, one cannot know that A caused B unless one can also observe or otherwise discover a “necessary connection” between these events. One certainly does not observe a necessary connection, so all one has seen or observed is events A and B. (Also, neither can we know something apart from experience [or a priori].) Furthermore, what one has observed is simply that an A event or action is followed by a B event, but simply observing a past experience cannot establish a necessary causal connection between events A and B. Why not? Because we have no reason to think that the future will be like the past. For it is possible that God could fiddle with the laws of nature over night and then in the morning A events no longer cause B events.

Armed with Hume’s epistemological understanding of causation, Alex rejects the “virtually undeniable” assertion of premise 1, since no one can prove that whatever comes into existence has a cause. However, there seems to be an assumption with Hume’s epistemological understanding of causation. That is, it assumes that one needs absolute certainty to prove that whatever comes into existence has a cause (premise 1). However, I don’t need absolute certainty concerning causal relationships in order to possess certain knowledge about the soundness of premise 1. That is, there seems to be levels of certainty (i.e. certainty beyond a reasonable doubt, or more probable than not certainty) that can provide me with enough reason to claim knowledge concerning the claim of premise 1. For this reason, the soundness of premise 1 seems unfazed by Hume’s epistemological understanding of causation.

The Trinity and a bit of Logic

Introduction

God as Trinity is an essential doctrine of the Christian faith and presents one with some of the most conceptually challenging ideas. The complication of such a teaching seems to result from the necessity to maintain some essential theological tenets: There is one God. The Father is God. The Son is God. And the Holy Spirit is God. But what precisely is this distinction between being and personhood, and can it really be the case that one being can be three persons? Such a theological claim seems to be a contradiction and incoherent. Also, in addition to overcoming a possible contradiction, one must also avoid and address heretical implications such as tritheism or modalism. In light of the difficulties that lay ahead, this blog post will set up two Trinitarian models that avoid any form of contradiction and do not fall prey to heresy.

Central Commitments and Characteristics of Trinitarianism 

The Trinitarian models that I will discuss are social Trinitarianism (ST) and anti social Trinitarianism (AST). The existence of these models comes from a differing placement of emphasis. That is, since Trinitarian doctrinal tenets seem illogical and incoherent, it is essential to lay out where one’s fundamental commitment lies. Moreover, where or with what does one begin? Should one begin with three persons who constitute one God, or with the one God who exists in three persons? In other words, is one primarily committed to the oneness of God or the threeness of God? Given the central concerns of each Trinitarian model, ST seeks to make sense of the doctrine from the starting point of the threeness of God. That is, it stresses the diversity of the persons who are equally God and yet distinctly self-conscious and possess their own intellect and will. AST begins with the oneness of God and the commitment that there is only one God and emphasizes the essence that each person of the trinity possesses.

Logical Problems of Trinitarianism

            So given the characteristics of each model, perhaps logic can illustrate coherency and orthodoxy. It might be noted that while the Trinity can be logically explained, it may come at the cost of unwittingly slipping into heresy. So suppose this theological argument (TA):

1. The Father (F) is God.
2. The Son (S) is God.
3. The Holy Spirit (HS) is God.
4. God is one.
5. Therefore, F, S, and HS are one God.

First, notice the validity of the argument. That is, the conclusion logically follows from the premises. Next, notice that the premises and conclusion are biblically/theologically uncontested. However, the problem with the argument lies with one’s definition and defense of the soundness (or truthfulness) of the premises and conclusion. So the first question one must ask is what does ‘is’ mean in premise 1, 2 and 3? In other words, what is meant by the statement F ‘is’ God? Perhaps one means that F is God in the same manner as he is identical to (or the same thing as) God. For example, such a grammatical distinction would be similar to how one understands these statements:

1. Eldrick Woods is the greatest golfer.
2. Tiger Woods is the greatest golfer.

Now these statements are certainty not a contradiction for they are the same person; however, if one were to explain TA following the same sort of logic, then it makes each person of the Trinity the same as (or identical to) each other. This is not orthodox Trinitarianism, but the heresy called Modalism (or Sabellianism) and a reasonable implication of AST. Remember that this Trinitarian model seeks to clarify Trinitarian logic according to the essence that each person possesses and is thus God. In other words, the Trinity is logically sound because the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have the essence or substance of Godness. But how is each person distinct if they are essentially of the same substance? In other words, how can this model emphasize the unity of God and not fall into Modalism?

Now to avoid Modalism, some have sought a different approach. That is, F ‘is’ God in that he is predicated with a quality. For example, take these two statements:

1. Nick is human.
2. Andrea is human.

These two statements do not contradict one another because Nick and Andrea are two different people, and human is a property that can be attributed to more than one person all at the same time. Now apply this logic to premises 1, 2 and 3 of TA and reframe them to reflect such a clarification:

1. F is divine.
2. S is divine.
3. HS is divine.    

Again, it seems that a contradiction and incoherency has been avoided, but now at the cost of claiming that there are three different divine beings based upon the fact (and similar to the notion) that Nick and Andrea are two different human beings. This is the heresy of tritheism and a logical implication of ST, which emphasizes the distinct characteristics of each person who are all predicated with the same quality. For how can this model emphasize the plurality of God and not be guilty of tritheism?

So what now? With both models flirting ever so closely with heresy, what can Christians do with such a sensitive and essential doctrine? The answers are not easy and no one should ever be convinced that they possess, with a clear and full understanding, the answers to questions that will also be humanly perplexing. However, perhaps some points can still be made that illustrates that both models do not commit heresy.

The Logic of Trinitarianism

The logical difficulties concerning the Trinity are far too real. For one the doctrine claims that there is but one God all the while affirming that there are three persons who are God. In an attempt to answer such challenging concepts, Michael Rea and Jeffrey Brower offer an account of the Trinity that is a type of AST.[1] Their model answers these problematic Trinitarian notions in the manner in which one answers the philosophical problem of material constitution.

            Brower and Rea illustrate their Trinitarian model with the Bronze statue analogy. To explain this a bit, the statue is made out of a lump of bronze. Then when the statue is constructed it is actually two objects: The lump of bronze and the constructed statue. Why? Because the statue and the lump of bronze possess different properties: namely, the lump of bronze can survive being melted down where as the statue cannot. Furthermore, the statue could have been constructed into different forms, similar to how a hand can be made into a fist, which further illustrates how the same matter can form two distinct things: the hand and the fist. Given this, Brower and Rea introduce Aristotle’s notion of accidental sameness. This concept permits one to count only one material object and at the same time deny that both the statue and the lump of bronze are exactly identical to one another.[2] In other words, since both the statue and the lump of bronze are the same material object, yet possess different properties, it can be said that there is only one material object and two distinct things constituted by one material object all at the same time.

With this helpful bit of logic, Brower and Rea follow Aristotle and provide another meaning to ‘is’ called “is of constitution.” Here is an example:

1. The statue is bronze.

The statement is telling us what the statue is constituted of: namely bronze. Therefore, each thing is not identical to the other but only of the same material. Now let’s apply this logic to premises 1, 2, and 3 of TA:

1. F is God.
2. S is God.
3. HS is God.

Now of course the persons of the Trinity are not material objects, but an immaterial substance or essence and would function in the same manner for God as matter does for material objects. Lastly, the conclusion (F, S, HS are one God.) would then mean that F, S, and HS are constituted by one God.

Therefore, it seems that Brower and Rea defend an AST model that avoids modalism. That is, each person of the Trinity is a distinct form constituted by the one divine immaterial essence. Once more, there is one immaterial substance or being that constitutes three distinct persons in the same manner that one material object constitutes two distinct objects: the statue and the lump of bronze.

Given this logical orthodox model of AST, what about a logical orthodox defense of ST? It seems that the best defense is set forth by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland and labeled “Trinity Monotheism.”[3] Given Brower and Rea’s primary emphasis on the oneness of God constituted by a divine substance or essence, Craig and Moreland’s primary emphasis is on the persons of the Trinity. They begin by redefining what is meant by “God” and/or “divine.” They claim that the persons of the Trinity exist in some sort of part-whole relation. That is, the whole Trinity represents the complete divine nature and is thus appropriately called God. In a sense, what is being said here is that God is necessarily a Trinity and that no one person is the whole Godhead. At the same time, no Person is 1/3 God. So, the Trinity as a whole symbolizes the Godhead and the persons are divine as they are parts of the Trinity. Moreland and Craig’s approach recalls the ‘is’ of predication mentioned above; however, each person of the Trinity are not individually “God” but F, S, and HS as a whole are predicated with the divine nature. 

To further illustrate their logic, Craig and Moreland employ a helpful cat analogy. One rightly says that a cat is feline. Also, one rightly claims that a cat’s DNA is feline as well as the cat’s skeleton. However, a cat’s DNA is not a cat and neither is a cat’s skeleton a cat but parts of the cat. So, the same logic can be applied to understanding the persons of the Trinity being distinct parts of the whole (i.e. God) but they alone (or by themselves) are not the whole.

But perhaps there is still a problem that needs to be addressed. For how can one logically conceive of three persons who exist as a part-whole relation and not be the very same being (the modalistic issue)? Moreover, if the starting point is the distinctiveness of the persons who possess their own consciousness and will, then how is this part-whole notion still not guilty of tritheism? Perhaps each question raised can be answered in the same manner. For it seems that one’s confusion concerning these points is the result of the limitation of human experience. Namely, a human has one immaterial soul that is associated with one set of rational faculties (i.e., one person). But perhaps (even though such a notion is out of human experience) it is plausible to conceive of an immaterial soul (or substance) that possesses three sets of rational faculties (i.e., The Father, Son and Holy Spirit). Therefore, what Moreland and Craig have defended is an adaptation of ST that seems to avoid tritheism.  

Conclusion: Theological Support and Importance for ST

So what now? What Trinitarian model is most preferred? It seems that both starting places are logically sound, so perhaps the answer is both! That is, perhaps each conform to orthodoxy and logic and for that reason both are absolutely appropriate for discussing Trinitarianism (for notice that each model has a clear expression of oneness and threeness). But maybe some theological implications can shed light on this issue and help determine which approach to the logic of the Trinity is most preferred.

First, theological implications of each model are crucial for the Christian faith. AST implies a discussion concerning the essence of God as it were a “thing” in addition to the three persons. What is more, this essence that each person of the trinity possesses and thus constitutes them as God may lead one to speak of God in an impersonal way. That is, the relationship between the divine essence of F, S and HS might lead one to worship a God that is a “thing” or better yet an “idea” and thus impersonal.

Next, the personal aspects of ST appeals to the enjoyment of the benefits experienced within the Trinitarian relationship and that the Christian will share with the persons of the Godhead. Again, this Trinitarian model begins with three persons who constitute a single God and such a starting point has wonderful implications for Christians. That is, once saved the Christian understands himself/herself as participating in and enjoying the benefits of that Trinitarian relationship.

Once one grasps the theological importance of ST, then Trinitarian discussion begins to become less about how one speaks of God as Trinity, and more about what God as Trinity theologically means (i.e. salvation). It seems that the fundamental issue of Trinitarianism is who the persons of the Trinity must be in order for one to be saved. More specifically, one’s talk about God as Trinity is done in the same manner as one’s talk about salvation. For who God is and how he saves believers are closely related topics.

Gregory of Nyssa established the oneness of God in light of a single activity in God that proceeds from the Father through the Son and is completed by the Holy Spirit. This is such a crucial point because such a life was not possible without the participation of each person which in turn was the result of one single act (i.e. redeeming humanity).[4] For the distinct sufficient cause of each person is crucial for salvation and a model that does not primarily focus on the threeness of God is theological or better yet soteriological less preferred.

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[1] Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 22:1 (2005): 57-76.

[2] In other words, they are distinct things but can be counted as one material object. See Aristotle Topics A7, 103a23-31; Metaphysics D6, 1015b16-22; 1016b32-1017a6.

[3] Moreland & Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: IVP, 2003), 589-95.

[4] Gregory of Nyssa, “Concerning We Should Think of Saying That There Are Not Three God to Ablabius,” in The Trinitarian Controversy, trans. and ed. William G. Rusch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 155.   

Did Christ Empty Himself of any Divine Properties during the Incarnation? A Theological Response to Kenotic Christology

Introduction:

The Chalcedonian Declaration and the Challenge of Kenotic Christology

“Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, is both perfect God and perfect man. He is one person with two natures, divine and human. Those natures exist without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.”

This orthodox statement is known as The Chalcedon Declaration. With it the church laid out its official position on the person and nature of Christ. However, since Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God, then he possesses the substance, essence or nature of Godness. Therefore, how is the Son also human? This affirmation of two natures was clear and nonnegotiable in the early church, but how is one to understand that the Son possesses both a human and divine nature and is yet one person?

It seems that the church was quick to reject the thought that the Incarnation involved the Logos stripping away certain divine properties in order to take on flesh; however, in recent years several scholars have sought to explain the logic of the incarnation in such a manner. Their theory focuses on the person of Christ in terms of some form of divine self-limitation as a result of becoming man. This theory is known as kenotic Christology, and is characterized as not simply wishing to drop the dual natures of Christ, but rather as a removal of certain divine attributes that seem incompatible with Christ being fully human. This theory has two versions defended amongst kenotic theorists. One involves an actual relinquishing of certain divine properties during the time of Christ’s incarnation (i.e. ontological kenosis), and the other focuses on Christ’s voluntary abandonment of certain divine properties (i.e. functional kenosis).

Therefore, is something within the second person of the Trinity altered when flesh is assumed? Did Christ actually empty part of his divine nature or voluntarily give up (or simply not exercise) the usage of certain divine attributes? Given this modern development in Christology, this blog post will provide a theological response to kenoticism, proving that orthodox Christology involves an understanding of the incarnation that is both fully God and truly man (as seen in The Chalcedon Definition) contra kenotic Christology.

A Theological Objection to Kenotic Christology:

The Necessary Properties (or Attributes) of Deity

            If any version of kenoticism is correct, then there seems to be a significant theological implication. To help illustrate this implication, suppose this theological argument (TA):

1. If Jesus, during his Incarnation, emptied himself of some divine attributes, then Jesus, during his incarnation, was not truly God.
2. If Jesus, during his incarnation, was not truly God, then he could not save us.
3. Jesus, during his Incarnation, emptied himself of some divine attributes. 
4. Therefore, Jesus, during his Incarnation, was not truly God.
5. Therefore, Jesus could not save us.

The argument appears valid, in that the logic follows from each premise; however, what about its soundness? It seems that the most crucial premise is 3, for the kenotic could easily question what it means to remain truly God and empty oneself of some divine attributes. It is at this point that the kenoticist makes a distinction between internal or essential attributes (love, joy, etc.) and external or contingent attributes (omnipotence, etc.). To illustrate this distinction consider this kenotic argument for a distinction of divine properties (DDP):

1. God has essential and contingent properties.
2. One essential divine property is love.
3. One contingent divine property is omniscience.
4. At the incarnation, Jesus takes on a human nature.
5. During the incarnation, Jesus abdicates certain contingent divine properties.
6. During the incarnation, Jesus does not abdicate any essential divine properties.  

With such a theological distinction set forth, the kenoticist could easily claim that since no essential divine properties were emptied during the incarnation, then Jesus is still fully God.

In aiding a response to the implication of DDP, suppose this theological statement (TS):

TS: Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God.

Orthodoxy affirms TS, but again what does TS mean by “is God”? This brings one back to premise 3 of TA. As noted above, kenoticism and DDP both affirm that Jesus emptied himself of some divine attributes; however, they do so by determining the manner in which Jesus, during his incarnation, would do such a thing and yet be truly God. In other words, it seems that they are claiming that Jesus can be truly God without being fully God. In other words, these forsaken divine attributes (i.e. the omni properties) are contingent and not essential for deity. However, there appears to be a problem with this thinking. That is, such a kenotic distinction makes an unnecessary distinction between Jesus being truly God and not fully God. That is, Jesus cannot be truly God without being fully God. Theologically speaking, how does Jesus’ claim “The person who has seen me has seen the Father” make any sense according to the kenotic claim that Jesus did not possess every divine property that the Father possessed? Therefore, the logical soundness of TA holds true and the Christ of kenoticism can therefore not save believers. Also, such a definition of the incarnation, as it relates to the essential nature of deity, entails a concept of God that might strike one as far too thin to be acceptable.

Conclusion: Salvation and The Incarnation

            Any type of kenotic Christological abandonment during the incarnation is theologically absurd. How is Christ going to save humanity if he does not possess all the properties of deity? Yes his human nature allows him to identify with the plight of human sinfulness, but if he is not fully God then he cannot offer salvation to the ones he came to save. In other words, if the incarnation is misunderstood, then believers do not have salvation. For it is by the incarnation that God restores humanity to himself.