The Trinity and a bit of Logic

Introduction

God as Trinity is an essential doctrine of the Christian faith and presents one with some of the most conceptually challenging ideas. The complication of such a teaching seems to result from the necessity to maintain some essential theological tenets: There is one God. The Father is God. The Son is God. And the Holy Spirit is God. But what precisely is this distinction between being and personhood, and can it really be the case that one being can be three persons? Such a theological claim seems to be a contradiction and incoherent. Also, in addition to overcoming a possible contradiction, one must also avoid and address heretical implications such as tritheism or modalism. In light of the difficulties that lay ahead, this blog post will set up two Trinitarian models that avoid any form of contradiction and do not fall prey to heresy.

Central Commitments and Characteristics of Trinitarianism 

The Trinitarian models that I will discuss are social Trinitarianism (ST) and anti social Trinitarianism (AST). The existence of these models comes from a differing placement of emphasis. That is, since Trinitarian doctrinal tenets seem illogical and incoherent, it is essential to lay out where one’s fundamental commitment lies. Moreover, where or with what does one begin? Should one begin with three persons who constitute one God, or with the one God who exists in three persons? In other words, is one primarily committed to the oneness of God or the threeness of God? Given the central concerns of each Trinitarian model, ST seeks to make sense of the doctrine from the starting point of the threeness of God. That is, it stresses the diversity of the persons who are equally God and yet distinctly self-conscious and possess their own intellect and will. AST begins with the oneness of God and the commitment that there is only one God and emphasizes the essence that each person of the trinity possesses.

Logical Problems of Trinitarianism

            So given the characteristics of each model, perhaps logic can illustrate coherency and orthodoxy. It might be noted that while the Trinity can be logically explained, it may come at the cost of unwittingly slipping into heresy. So suppose this theological argument (TA):

1. The Father (F) is God.
2. The Son (S) is God.
3. The Holy Spirit (HS) is God.
4. God is one.
5. Therefore, F, S, and HS are one God.

First, notice the validity of the argument. That is, the conclusion logically follows from the premises. Next, notice that the premises and conclusion are biblically/theologically uncontested. However, the problem with the argument lies with one’s definition and defense of the soundness (or truthfulness) of the premises and conclusion. So the first question one must ask is what does ‘is’ mean in premise 1, 2 and 3? In other words, what is meant by the statement F ‘is’ God? Perhaps one means that F is God in the same manner as he is identical to (or the same thing as) God. For example, such a grammatical distinction would be similar to how one understands these statements:

1. Eldrick Woods is the greatest golfer.
2. Tiger Woods is the greatest golfer.

Now these statements are certainty not a contradiction for they are the same person; however, if one were to explain TA following the same sort of logic, then it makes each person of the Trinity the same as (or identical to) each other. This is not orthodox Trinitarianism, but the heresy called Modalism (or Sabellianism) and a reasonable implication of AST. Remember that this Trinitarian model seeks to clarify Trinitarian logic according to the essence that each person possesses and is thus God. In other words, the Trinity is logically sound because the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have the essence or substance of Godness. But how is each person distinct if they are essentially of the same substance? In other words, how can this model emphasize the unity of God and not fall into Modalism?

Now to avoid Modalism, some have sought a different approach. That is, F ‘is’ God in that he is predicated with a quality. For example, take these two statements:

1. Nick is human.
2. Andrea is human.

These two statements do not contradict one another because Nick and Andrea are two different people, and human is a property that can be attributed to more than one person all at the same time. Now apply this logic to premises 1, 2 and 3 of TA and reframe them to reflect such a clarification:

1. F is divine.
2. S is divine.
3. HS is divine.    

Again, it seems that a contradiction and incoherency has been avoided, but now at the cost of claiming that there are three different divine beings based upon the fact (and similar to the notion) that Nick and Andrea are two different human beings. This is the heresy of tritheism and a logical implication of ST, which emphasizes the distinct characteristics of each person who are all predicated with the same quality. For how can this model emphasize the plurality of God and not be guilty of tritheism?

So what now? With both models flirting ever so closely with heresy, what can Christians do with such a sensitive and essential doctrine? The answers are not easy and no one should ever be convinced that they possess, with a clear and full understanding, the answers to questions that will also be humanly perplexing. However, perhaps some points can still be made that illustrates that both models do not commit heresy.

The Logic of Trinitarianism

The logical difficulties concerning the Trinity are far too real. For one the doctrine claims that there is but one God all the while affirming that there are three persons who are God. In an attempt to answer such challenging concepts, Michael Rea and Jeffrey Brower offer an account of the Trinity that is a type of AST.[1] Their model answers these problematic Trinitarian notions in the manner in which one answers the philosophical problem of material constitution.

            Brower and Rea illustrate their Trinitarian model with the Bronze statue analogy. To explain this a bit, the statue is made out of a lump of bronze. Then when the statue is constructed it is actually two objects: The lump of bronze and the constructed statue. Why? Because the statue and the lump of bronze possess different properties: namely, the lump of bronze can survive being melted down where as the statue cannot. Furthermore, the statue could have been constructed into different forms, similar to how a hand can be made into a fist, which further illustrates how the same matter can form two distinct things: the hand and the fist. Given this, Brower and Rea introduce Aristotle’s notion of accidental sameness. This concept permits one to count only one material object and at the same time deny that both the statue and the lump of bronze are exactly identical to one another.[2] In other words, since both the statue and the lump of bronze are the same material object, yet possess different properties, it can be said that there is only one material object and two distinct things constituted by one material object all at the same time.

With this helpful bit of logic, Brower and Rea follow Aristotle and provide another meaning to ‘is’ called “is of constitution.” Here is an example:

1. The statue is bronze.

The statement is telling us what the statue is constituted of: namely bronze. Therefore, each thing is not identical to the other but only of the same material. Now let’s apply this logic to premises 1, 2, and 3 of TA:

1. F is God.
2. S is God.
3. HS is God.

Now of course the persons of the Trinity are not material objects, but an immaterial substance or essence and would function in the same manner for God as matter does for material objects. Lastly, the conclusion (F, S, HS are one God.) would then mean that F, S, and HS are constituted by one God.

Therefore, it seems that Brower and Rea defend an AST model that avoids modalism. That is, each person of the Trinity is a distinct form constituted by the one divine immaterial essence. Once more, there is one immaterial substance or being that constitutes three distinct persons in the same manner that one material object constitutes two distinct objects: the statue and the lump of bronze.

Given this logical orthodox model of AST, what about a logical orthodox defense of ST? It seems that the best defense is set forth by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland and labeled “Trinity Monotheism.”[3] Given Brower and Rea’s primary emphasis on the oneness of God constituted by a divine substance or essence, Craig and Moreland’s primary emphasis is on the persons of the Trinity. They begin by redefining what is meant by “God” and/or “divine.” They claim that the persons of the Trinity exist in some sort of part-whole relation. That is, the whole Trinity represents the complete divine nature and is thus appropriately called God. In a sense, what is being said here is that God is necessarily a Trinity and that no one person is the whole Godhead. At the same time, no Person is 1/3 God. So, the Trinity as a whole symbolizes the Godhead and the persons are divine as they are parts of the Trinity. Moreland and Craig’s approach recalls the ‘is’ of predication mentioned above; however, each person of the Trinity are not individually “God” but F, S, and HS as a whole are predicated with the divine nature. 

To further illustrate their logic, Craig and Moreland employ a helpful cat analogy. One rightly says that a cat is feline. Also, one rightly claims that a cat’s DNA is feline as well as the cat’s skeleton. However, a cat’s DNA is not a cat and neither is a cat’s skeleton a cat but parts of the cat. So, the same logic can be applied to understanding the persons of the Trinity being distinct parts of the whole (i.e. God) but they alone (or by themselves) are not the whole.

But perhaps there is still a problem that needs to be addressed. For how can one logically conceive of three persons who exist as a part-whole relation and not be the very same being (the modalistic issue)? Moreover, if the starting point is the distinctiveness of the persons who possess their own consciousness and will, then how is this part-whole notion still not guilty of tritheism? Perhaps each question raised can be answered in the same manner. For it seems that one’s confusion concerning these points is the result of the limitation of human experience. Namely, a human has one immaterial soul that is associated with one set of rational faculties (i.e., one person). But perhaps (even though such a notion is out of human experience) it is plausible to conceive of an immaterial soul (or substance) that possesses three sets of rational faculties (i.e., The Father, Son and Holy Spirit). Therefore, what Moreland and Craig have defended is an adaptation of ST that seems to avoid tritheism.  

Conclusion: Theological Support and Importance for ST

So what now? What Trinitarian model is most preferred? It seems that both starting places are logically sound, so perhaps the answer is both! That is, perhaps each conform to orthodoxy and logic and for that reason both are absolutely appropriate for discussing Trinitarianism (for notice that each model has a clear expression of oneness and threeness). But maybe some theological implications can shed light on this issue and help determine which approach to the logic of the Trinity is most preferred.

First, theological implications of each model are crucial for the Christian faith. AST implies a discussion concerning the essence of God as it were a “thing” in addition to the three persons. What is more, this essence that each person of the trinity possesses and thus constitutes them as God may lead one to speak of God in an impersonal way. That is, the relationship between the divine essence of F, S and HS might lead one to worship a God that is a “thing” or better yet an “idea” and thus impersonal.

Next, the personal aspects of ST appeals to the enjoyment of the benefits experienced within the Trinitarian relationship and that the Christian will share with the persons of the Godhead. Again, this Trinitarian model begins with three persons who constitute a single God and such a starting point has wonderful implications for Christians. That is, once saved the Christian understands himself/herself as participating in and enjoying the benefits of that Trinitarian relationship.

Once one grasps the theological importance of ST, then Trinitarian discussion begins to become less about how one speaks of God as Trinity, and more about what God as Trinity theologically means (i.e. salvation). It seems that the fundamental issue of Trinitarianism is who the persons of the Trinity must be in order for one to be saved. More specifically, one’s talk about God as Trinity is done in the same manner as one’s talk about salvation. For who God is and how he saves believers are closely related topics.

Gregory of Nyssa established the oneness of God in light of a single activity in God that proceeds from the Father through the Son and is completed by the Holy Spirit. This is such a crucial point because such a life was not possible without the participation of each person which in turn was the result of one single act (i.e. redeeming humanity).[4] For the distinct sufficient cause of each person is crucial for salvation and a model that does not primarily focus on the threeness of God is theological or better yet soteriological less preferred.

---

[1] Jeffrey E. Brower and Michael C. Rea, “Material Constitution and the Trinity,” Faith and Philosophy 22:1 (2005): 57-76.

[2] In other words, they are distinct things but can be counted as one material object. See Aristotle Topics A7, 103a23-31; Metaphysics D6, 1015b16-22; 1016b32-1017a6.

[3] Moreland & Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove: IVP, 2003), 589-95.

[4] Gregory of Nyssa, “Concerning We Should Think of Saying That There Are Not Three God to Ablabius,” in The Trinitarian Controversy, trans. and ed. William G. Rusch (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 155.   

Did Christ Empty Himself of any Divine Properties during the Incarnation? A Theological Response to Kenotic Christology

Introduction:

The Chalcedonian Declaration and the Challenge of Kenotic Christology

“Jesus Christ, the eternal Son of God, is both perfect God and perfect man. He is one person with two natures, divine and human. Those natures exist without confusion, without change, without division, without separation.”

This orthodox statement is known as The Chalcedon Declaration. With it the church laid out its official position on the person and nature of Christ. However, since Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God, then he possesses the substance, essence or nature of Godness. Therefore, how is the Son also human? This affirmation of two natures was clear and nonnegotiable in the early church, but how is one to understand that the Son possesses both a human and divine nature and is yet one person?

It seems that the church was quick to reject the thought that the Incarnation involved the Logos stripping away certain divine properties in order to take on flesh; however, in recent years several scholars have sought to explain the logic of the incarnation in such a manner. Their theory focuses on the person of Christ in terms of some form of divine self-limitation as a result of becoming man. This theory is known as kenotic Christology, and is characterized as not simply wishing to drop the dual natures of Christ, but rather as a removal of certain divine attributes that seem incompatible with Christ being fully human. This theory has two versions defended amongst kenotic theorists. One involves an actual relinquishing of certain divine properties during the time of Christ’s incarnation (i.e. ontological kenosis), and the other focuses on Christ’s voluntary abandonment of certain divine properties (i.e. functional kenosis).

Therefore, is something within the second person of the Trinity altered when flesh is assumed? Did Christ actually empty part of his divine nature or voluntarily give up (or simply not exercise) the usage of certain divine attributes? Given this modern development in Christology, this blog post will provide a theological response to kenoticism, proving that orthodox Christology involves an understanding of the incarnation that is both fully God and truly man (as seen in The Chalcedon Definition) contra kenotic Christology.

A Theological Objection to Kenotic Christology:

The Necessary Properties (or Attributes) of Deity

            If any version of kenoticism is correct, then there seems to be a significant theological implication. To help illustrate this implication, suppose this theological argument (TA):

1. If Jesus, during his Incarnation, emptied himself of some divine attributes, then Jesus, during his incarnation, was not truly God.
2. If Jesus, during his incarnation, was not truly God, then he could not save us.
3. Jesus, during his Incarnation, emptied himself of some divine attributes. 
4. Therefore, Jesus, during his Incarnation, was not truly God.
5. Therefore, Jesus could not save us.

The argument appears valid, in that the logic follows from each premise; however, what about its soundness? It seems that the most crucial premise is 3, for the kenotic could easily question what it means to remain truly God and empty oneself of some divine attributes. It is at this point that the kenoticist makes a distinction between internal or essential attributes (love, joy, etc.) and external or contingent attributes (omnipotence, etc.). To illustrate this distinction consider this kenotic argument for a distinction of divine properties (DDP):

1. God has essential and contingent properties.
2. One essential divine property is love.
3. One contingent divine property is omniscience.
4. At the incarnation, Jesus takes on a human nature.
5. During the incarnation, Jesus abdicates certain contingent divine properties.
6. During the incarnation, Jesus does not abdicate any essential divine properties.  

With such a theological distinction set forth, the kenoticist could easily claim that since no essential divine properties were emptied during the incarnation, then Jesus is still fully God.

In aiding a response to the implication of DDP, suppose this theological statement (TS):

TS: Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is God.

Orthodoxy affirms TS, but again what does TS mean by “is God”? This brings one back to premise 3 of TA. As noted above, kenoticism and DDP both affirm that Jesus emptied himself of some divine attributes; however, they do so by determining the manner in which Jesus, during his incarnation, would do such a thing and yet be truly God. In other words, it seems that they are claiming that Jesus can be truly God without being fully God. In other words, these forsaken divine attributes (i.e. the omni properties) are contingent and not essential for deity. However, there appears to be a problem with this thinking. That is, such a kenotic distinction makes an unnecessary distinction between Jesus being truly God and not fully God. That is, Jesus cannot be truly God without being fully God. Theologically speaking, how does Jesus’ claim “The person who has seen me has seen the Father” make any sense according to the kenotic claim that Jesus did not possess every divine property that the Father possessed? Therefore, the logical soundness of TA holds true and the Christ of kenoticism can therefore not save believers. Also, such a definition of the incarnation, as it relates to the essential nature of deity, entails a concept of God that might strike one as far too thin to be acceptable.

Conclusion: Salvation and The Incarnation

            Any type of kenotic Christological abandonment during the incarnation is theologically absurd. How is Christ going to save humanity if he does not possess all the properties of deity? Yes his human nature allows him to identify with the plight of human sinfulness, but if he is not fully God then he cannot offer salvation to the ones he came to save. In other words, if the incarnation is misunderstood, then believers do not have salvation. For it is by the incarnation that God restores humanity to himself.

A Hell of a Problem! (Or, Univeralism and the Problem of Hell)

So lately I've been reading The Evangelical Universalist. In the book the author seeks to answer each of the following questions in the affirmative: Can an orthodox Christian, committed to the historical faith of the church and the authority of the Bible, be a universalist? Is it possible to believe that salvation is found only by grace, through faith in Christ, and yet to maintain that in the end all people will be saved? Can one believe passionately in mission if one does not think that anyone will be lost? Could universalism be consistent with the teachings of the Bible? I must say this is quite intriguing, but I'm afraid a travesty as well. This post will primarily focus attention on one of the author's philosophical problems with traditional Christian teachings on hell. 

The philosophical argument I'll address is what the author calls "The Problem of the Joy of the Redeemed." The basic principle here is that if the redeemed have eschatological bliss, then they cannot know of anyone they love who is suffering eternally with no hope of salvation. Here is his argument.

1. Supremely worthwhile happiness (or eschatological bliss of the redeemed) must (a) survive complete disclosure of the truth concerning the universe and (b) the redeemed (S) must be filled with love for others.
2. Given 1.a, Supremely worthwhile happiness cannot be based on deception or false factual beliefs. And given 1.b, Supremely worthwhile happiness cannot exist if S knows people but does not love them.
3. Supremely worthwhile happiness can be jeopardized if S loves someone who eternally suffers with no hope of salvation. 
4. Therefore, supremely worthwhile happiness exists if and only if S has genuine knowledge of the fate of loved ones and remains happy.
5. S can only remain happy concerning loved ones if their fate is ultimately a blessed one.
6. Therefore, S can only have supremely worthwhile happiness if no loved ones eternally suffer with no hope of salvation. 

This argument seems to be logically valid in that each premise follows from the other(s), but the soundness of 1.a should be firmly rejected. For example, Bill Craig suggests that complete disclosure of the truth concerning the universe does not entail that the redeemed (S) must be aware of the fate of the damned. Craig provides us with two valid possibilities: either 1) God could wipe away S's memory of loved ones who suffer or (2) the ascetics of the eschatological state might be so all-consuming that S never thinks about them. 

But the universalist isn't quite ready to concede just yet. For here the author replies with a rejection of both Craigian options. The memory-wipe option would lead to deletion of huge chunks of past memories, memories about eternally suffering loved ones who were instrumental to S's salvation. And the second option does not mean that S will be made less aware of pains of others but more. In other words, the escaton would makes us more aware that God loves the righteous and hates the wicked. 

Perhaps the universalist has a point, but for now I'm still persuaded that they are missing the point. S's eschatological bliss is primarily about the joy and memory they have towards a God who saved him/her. Yes eternally damned individuals in S's memory bank could cause them to not be happy, but why is that memory crucial for self awareness? Moreover, the point seems to be that God saved S who remembers clearly that they needed to be saved, but the instrument used by God is secondary and not essential for self awareness or perhaps better said self identification. 

Next, I think the universalist's rejection of Craig's second option seems possible, but what can be said about S's overwhelming happiness for a God who ultimately saved him/her that it overshadows the reality that there are people S loved who are suffering? What I'm trying to say is that if S's joy and happiness is primarily and supremely directed towards God because of S's need to be saved, them why would S ever think about the secondary instruments used by God?

I hope this provides some good food for thought, and what do you think about all of this?

The Kalam Cosmological Argument and Libertarian Inconsistency

In an earlier post, I made the suggestion that some libertarians are guilty of being inconsistent if they hold to a certain cosmological argument for God's existence. The cosmological argument I have in mind is the kalam cosmological argument. However, amongst the responses a friend was more than willing to reject this version because he felt it had too many presuppositions built into it. Therefore, what I would like to do here is lay out the three premises of the argument, and in hopes of defending it provide proof for the inconsistency of the libertarian.

First of all, here are the premises:

1. Whatever begins to exist has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.

Quickly notice that the argument is quite simple and easy to remember. Also notice the argument's validity and soundness. For if one was to reject the conclusion (premise 3), then he/she must prove either premise 1 or 2 to be false because the conclusion necessarily follows from the two premises. Lastly, notice the direction the argument is going in. Namely, the universe must have a beginning, and since nothing begins to exist without a cause, there must be a transcendent creator of the universe. 

So this is the question and challenge for the libertarian: Either what reasons do you have to reject this argument? Or how do you account for such validity and soundness and still claim that your actions, which have come into existence, have no transcendent cause?

Athanansius' Logical Argument against Arianism

While completing what right now seems endless reading for my summer course- Trinitarian and Christological Controversies, I came across a most intriguing logical argument from Athanansius for the divinity of Jesus, the Son of God. Also, the thoughts here are a further result of the class notes and presentation of the class notes by my prof- Dr. Don Fairbairn. 

In Athanansius' Orations Against the Arians, he sets forth three types of arguments: Direct Biblical Arguments; Biblical/Logical Arguments; and Biblical/Soteriological Arguments. And again, the most interesting one to me was his logical argument. 

The logical argument in particular that caught my eye responded to Arius' understanding of who Jesus is. Specifically, Athanasius is responding to the Arian notion that the Father is the One (God) and Jesus is the first one and greatest of all created beings. In other words, Arianism pushes the subordination of the Son to a logical conclusion (which Origen might have already implicitly stated) and explicitly denies the Son's deity. The Son is a creature whom the Father has created out of nothing, and is only God in the sense that he has been given the dignity of deity.

This Arian thinking caused many (Athanasius included) to respond quite harshly, and this brings us Athanasius' logical response to such a notion. First, Athanasius begins with distinguishing between partaking and entire participation within the Godhead. If the Son partakes of the Father's deity, then he is not a true Son at all. The Son must entirely participate in the Father nature (physis or ousia) in order for the Son to be divine and thus save humanity. In other words, the Son participates by nature in the Godhead. He is naturally God just like the Father.

He then argues that if the Son was not eternally a Son, then the Father was at one time a one, then a two and then three. Now, it was not important to Arianism to uphold a trinitarian understanding, but what would have been important was upholding the Father as ineffable, immutable and unchangeable. So, for the Father to at one time not be a father and at another time be a father would be impossible, since this would imply an imperfection and change in God (the Father). In other words, if there was ever a time when God had no Son, then he was not always Father. Moreover, if God were not always a Father, then what could one say about a time when God would stop being a trinity? Perhaps either adding or subtracting another. 

But Athanasius must address the Scriptural teaching that the Son was begotten by the Father. While Arius claimed that if the Son was begotten then he was created, Athanasius made a distinction between divine and human begetting. Human beings become fathers and sons temporarily, but the Father produces or becomes a father eternally. 

Athanasius proves to be one of Christianity's most able defenders of orthodoxy as it relates to our beliefs about how Jesus is. Well done Athanasius...well done.

Some Thoughts on Being Devotional in Academic Reading

This morning, while completing some reading for my summer course- The Trinitarian and Christological Controversies, I came across a most delightful, and in many respects encouraging and challenging quote from C.S. Lewis. In the Popular Patristics Series published by St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, Lewis writes an introduction for St Athanasius’ On the Incarnation and on page 8, Lewis writes:

“For my own part I tend to find the doctrinal books often more helpful in devotion than the devotional books, and I rather suspect that the same experience may await many other. I believe that many who find that “nothing happens” when they sit down, or kneel down, to a book of devotion, would find that the heart sings unbidden while they are working their way through a tough bit of theology.”

How true this is for me, but seldom heard from many in the church. What Lewis is getting at here is the needless division between two types of Christian books: those that tend to spiritualize and devotionalize matter and those that tend to be more academically rigorous and technical. We all know what books and authors I am referring to here, and while both have their usefulness, I cannot tell you how many doctrinal, academically rigorous books have caused the devotional cords of my heart to sing. Of course part of Lewis’ quote gets to the issue that the devotional books don’t really say anything. Now I don’t mean that every devotional/pastoral book out there is guilty of such criticism, but the best books for spiritual devotion seem to be “a tough bit of theology” because of what it forces one to do. That is, think much harder and deeper about the issue at hand.

I would like to conclude with what I think this really gets at today. Namely, this quote both encourages and challenges the Christian to read rather difficult doctrinal books and not separate the spiritual and devotional aspects of the literature from the academic rigor. For how often do we as Christian do that? I know I have heard this method told to me many times! For example, there were several instances in my undergraduate education, where students and professors alike told me that in addition to my classroom assignments and studies I need to have a personal “quite time.” But why?! Is not Scripture just that-Scripture? Are we to ever separate those spiritual teachings found in the Word from our academic study? As it seems Paul would respond, “mh… gevnoito” or “Certainly not!” Shouldn’t we always be devotional in every aspect of our study of the Word (whether we are dealing with the Word itself, or a secondary source)? In other words, shouldn’t our study of the Word always be applied to matters of our Christian life? I think so. And I think Lewis is encouraging and challenging us to do the same.

The Context, Controversies and Future of Evangelicalism

Introduction 

I would like to state up front that I am a confessing evangelical, a graduate of an evangelical bible college and currently a graduate student of an evangelical seminary. So rest assured that this is not an attack on evangelicalism, but hopefully a helpful reminder of where we have come from and anticipating where we are going. Given this disclaimer, it is important to state that evangelicals are not unaware of the controversies and debates of specific doctrinal issues that took place and are taking place under the evangelical tent. Moreover, these evangelical disagreements have been the topic of discussion in some of my seminary classes and cause for some interesting dialogue (in many respects, much of what follows in the product one of those classes and its notes). Therefore, I would like to briefly outline the contexts of some of these controversies, which may help us in understanding our disputes better and perhaps settle them (maybe), and conclude with a suggestion on how to move evangelicalism forward in the 21^st century.

The Context and Controversies of Evangelicalism

First the context of the 20^th century posed some interesting controversies. Without going into great detail the point of these evangelical diversities points us in the direction of the existence of theological differences within the movement. In the early 20th century, millennial debates and dispensationalism were of huge interest. The mid-century introduced us to the charismatic movement. The 1960s produced controversies concerning gender roles as they related to women ordination. The 1970s-80s saw issues of contemporary worship and defining and defending the inerrancy of Scripture. Most recently, the meaning of justification has been the hot bottom topic within evangelicalism.

Many of the age old debates, such as Calvinism and Arminianism, the nature of the Spiritual gifts, gender roles, the sacraments (e.g. baptism and the Lord’s Supper), find their supporters among the evangelical camps and are till an issue today. In other words, as a group we have not solved these debates. Even our high view of Scripture, which I’ll mention soon, has not led to a consensus understanding of how to interpret Scripture. In fact, there are considerable differences about “how” to interpret the Scriptures and this of course results in biblical/theological differences. These evangelical biblical/theological differences have caused evangelicalism to define itself, and in light of the disagreement within academia and the church, who decides what answers are “correct”? Moreover, who decides what issues we must argue on in order to be an evangelical?

In an effort to define evangelicalism, the Evangelical Theological Society (ETS) provides a doctrinal basis that one must sign every year in order to be a member of the society. It reads, “The Bible alone, and the Bible in its entirety, is the Word of God written and is therefore inerrant in the autographs. God is a Trinity, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, each an uncreated person, one in essence, equal in power and glory.” First, such a statement is often associated with notions of the essentials of evangelicalism and in it we find a specific understanding of the authority and nature of Scripture as well as the nature of the trinity. However, is this enough to establish evangelicalism and one as an evangelical? Yes there are many doctrinal aspects that evangelicals must agree on: such as, the final authority of Scripture, the divinity of Jesus Christ and a need for personal faith in him; however, what about the nature of Christ’s work on the cross? What did it primarily accomplish? Victory and defeat of Satan’s hold on humanity, a satisfaction of God’s wrath, a moral example, etc.? Furthermore, the nature of humanity and the necessity to live a life spiritually transformed? Lastly, what about the importance of mission work for furthering the kingdom (whatever it looks like)? Therefore, along the similar vain of the in the previous paragraph, what confessions are essential and who decides that?

So the doctrinal aspects of a definition of evangelicalism are quite diverse among confessional evangelicals (e.g. evangelical Methodists and Presbyterians). There may be some affirmation of essential doctrines and thus in a sense unity, but it does not take too long to find many aspects of doctrinal diversity within the essential doctrines and then some. As a result, it seems that the theological characteristics and professions of evangelicalism are not enough to primarily hold it together and define it.

Not even cultural definitions can hold evangelicalism together. While evangelicalism is commonly identified as “politically conservative” (e.g. the republican party), who defend ethical issues such as pro-life and anti-gay marriage, there are many evangelicals who vote for different parties. Moreover, there are many non-evangelicals who are also “culture conservatives” (e.g. Roman Catholics and Mormons). Also, there are many who seek to hold evangelicalism together from a scientific approach, but this is flawed as well. For while evangelicals are typically labeled as “scientifically conservative” (e.g. creationism and intelligent design), who hold certain scientific notions about the age of the earth and anti-evolutionary theories, there are many evangelicals who hold an old earth view as well as certain notions of evolutionary theological theories (check out BioLogos http://biologos.org/).

In light of the insufficiency to define evangelicalism with a doctrinal/theological profession, and culturally political and scientific standpoints, many scholars have gone the route of defining evangelicalism in light of historical paradigms. George Marsden suggests a Protestant paradigm as it understands evangelicalism’s close association to the heritage of the Protestant Reformation. I think Marsden rightly notices this, but there seems to be more to evangelicalism historically than just the Protestant Reformation. As a result of many unanswered historical influences, Donald Dayton claims that a Pentecostal paradigm is best as it notices a common heritage in the revivals of the 19^th (2nd Great Awakening) and 20^th (Pentecostal) centuries. But still there seems to be things that Dayton’s paradigm leaves out. In light of the diversity here, Daryl Hart asserts that no paradigm is sufficient to account for the diverse heritage of evangelicalism. There are many historical narratives and heritages that relate to characteristics of evangelicals, so which one is best? As seen above, elements of the protestant reformation (e.g. faith alone) and historical revival movement find there respective roots in evangelicalism (e.g. the urgency of conversion and para-church ministries), so how can we say one is more prominent than another? The later option might be the better one at the moment, since it seems that no single paradigm can account for all the moving (evangelical) parts.

What seems to best define and unite evangelicalism is what it stands against. In other words, what best defines evangelicalism is not what it is but what it is not. For example, evangelical’s battle with modernism is the common enemy of evangelicals and in a sense an accurate defining aspect of the movement. Our attacks against the ethical relativists, the religious atheists, liberal Jesus scholars (e.g. Bart Ehrman, and the “scholars” of the Jesus Seminar), etc are just as much a definitional aspect of who we are as a movement as what our creeds say.

Conclusion: The Future of Evangelicalism  

The contexts and controversies of evangelicalism are quite numerous and there is more to be explored. There are two books coming out that I need to read on this topic before I make any more concluding remarks regarding what the future of evangelicalism will look like: Four Views on the Spectrum of Evangelicalism and Evangelicalism: What Is It and Is It Worth Keeping? by D.A. Carson. But some thoughts would be that we must clearly define what we are and I think that evangelicalism can only do that if it sees itself as a movement instead of a religious group or organization within Protestant Christianity. My reason for saying this is because there seems to be too much infighting than actual agreement on specific issues. If we understand evangelicalism as a religious movement within Protestant Christianity, then the things we stand for can often be associated with reforming and reviving specific Christian groups.